OPINION:
At the Ninth Congress of the Workers’ Party of Korea, held every five years, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un left the door open for engagement with the U.S. and reaffirmed hostility with South Korea.
The seven-day congress replaced more than 40% of senior officials with younger loyalists, including Mr. Kim’s sister, Kim Yo-jong, who was promoted to general affairs director of the Central Committee. A five-year economic plan emphasized self-reliance and national development. It included ambitious targets for grain production and industrial output, emphasizing ideological cohesion.
The congress codified North Korea’s status as a permanent nuclear-armed state, emphasizing further nuclear expansion and modernization. It also stated that North Korea’s conventional forces would be upgraded.
A new concept, referred to as “Haekpangasoe” (nuclear trigger), was formalized, according to the Korean Central News Agency, as an integrated nuclear crisis response system designed to ensure the national nuclear shield can be operated promptly and accurately at any time.
Thus, North Korea’s nuclear deterrent now includes a preemptive nuclear strike capability.
North Korea formally reaffirmed its hostility toward South Korea, designating it the “first hostile state” and institutionalizing severed ties, effectively discarding the long-standing policy of reunification. This was North Korea doubling down on its “two hostile states” doctrine.
While clearly emphasizing antagonism toward South Korea, Mr. Kim suggested openness to talks with Washington, but only if the U.S. accepts North Korea’s nuclear status and abandons its “hostile policy” toward North Korea.
There is speculation that President Trump’s scheduled April visit to China to meet with President Xi Jinping would be an opportune time for our commander in chief to meet again with Mr. Kim, this time in Beijing or Pyongyang. The men’s initial meeting in Singapore in 2018 was relatively successful, resulting in a joint statement committing both countries to establishing a new relationship in accordance with the desire of the peoples of the two countries for peace and prosperity. North Korea is committed to working toward the complete denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
The 2019 summit in Hanoi failed when Mr. Trump ended the meeting abruptly after Mr. Kim would include his plutonium reactor at Yongbyon only in exchange for the lifting of sanctions. A brief symbolic meeting at the Demilitarized Zone later in 2019 did not include a substantive discussion of sanctions relief for denuclearization.
Much has happened since North Korea’s Eighth Party Congress in January 2021. Complete and verifiable denuclearization is now off the table. In 2022, North Korea officially enshrined the right to use preemptive nuclear strikes to protect itself from an imminent or perceived imminent attack.
The Ninth Party Congress has now memorialized the Haekpangasoe nuclear trigger doctrine, ensuring that nuclear weapons can and will be used in response to perceived threats. South Korea, despite efforts of the Lee Jae-myung government to improve relations with North Korea, is viewed by North Korea as its “most hostile entity.”
North Korea renounced reunification and institutionalized the “two hostile states” doctrine while keeping the door open to another summit with Mr. Trump — if the U.S. accepts North Korea as a nuclear weapons state and discontinues its “hostile policy.”
Equally important is the June 2024 comprehensive strategic partnership between North Korea and Russia and their mutual defense treaty, with North Korea providing more than 12,000 troops to support Russia in its war of aggression against Ukraine. In addition to troops, North Korea is providing Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles and reportedly receiving missile and nuclear assistance from Russia.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula is tense, with a nuclear North Korea, aligned with Russia and China, viewing South Korea as the enemy. Given North Korea’s emphasis on tactical nuclear weapons and its doctrine dealing with the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, efforts to de-escalate tension on the Korean Peninsula are necessary.
Mr. Kim’s comment at the Ninth Party Congress that North Korea could “get along” with the U.S., and apparent willingness to again meet with Mr. Trump, could be the only viable option for defusing the potential for conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
Another meeting with Mr. Kim does not mean the U.S. has to accept North Korea as a nuclear weapons state. It means we don’t have to put denuclearization up front in our discussions with North Korea. We do, however, need to talk about sanctions relief, economic development assistance, peaceful nuclear energy and a path to normal relations when North Korea makes progress on human rights.
In return, North Korea will have to agree to a moratorium on nuclear tests, fissile material production for nuclear weapons, and medium- and long-range ballistic missile launches. Eventually, denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula will have to be discussed, but that could be after a decade or more of negotiations.
Another summit between the leaders of the U.S. and North Korea is in the interest of peace and stability in East Asia.
• The author is a former associate director of national intelligence. All statements of fact, opinion or analysis expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official positions or views of the U.S. government. Nothing in the contents should be construed as asserting or implying U.S. government authentication of information or endorsement of the author’s views.
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