OPINION:
As Washington debates how to deal with Iran, one option is often dismissed as unrealistic: regime change. Yet history suggests it works.
Iran is a totalitarian state, and regime change is the only strategy that has consistently worked against totalitarian regimes. It helped us achieve America’s greatest foreign policy successes: the defeat and transformation of Nazi Germany and imperial Japan after World War II and the collapse of Soviet communism at the end of the 20th century.
Today’s Iran is driven by an Islamist ideology that defines the United States and the democratic world as enemies. As long as that regime remains intact, diplomatic efforts to moderate its behavior are unlikely to succeed.
Two fundamental reasons explain why the regime change strategy works against totalitarian states.
First, nothing else works. Diplomatic engagement repeatedly fails because totalitarian regimes aren’t governed by pragmatic national interests; they are led by ideology. Instead of calculations of mutual benefit, their policies are driven by doctrinal commitments that define the democratic world as the enemy.
History offers numerous examples of such failures: appeasement of Nazi Germany, detente with the Soviet Union and, of course, repeated diplomatic attempts to moderate Iran’s behavior.
Second, totalitarian regimes represent the most radical, aggressive form of political order. Concerns that regime change might produce something worse are thus largely unfounded. Once such a regime is removed, its successor is highly unlikely to become more radical.
Critics of regime change often cite Iraq and Libya as failures, but those were authoritarian, not totalitarian, regimes. The strategic logic is different. Applying regime change there through direct military intervention was a strategic mistake. That doesn’t invalidate the policy where it’s appropriate.
To understand why regime change works against totalitarian regimes, one must understand the regimes’ nature. Totalitarian systems are governed by ideology, not individuals. Leaders — whether dictators, party secretaries or ayatollahs — operate within strict ideological boundaries. They serve the ideology rather than shape it.
Every major totalitarian ideology — Nazism, communism or Islamism — defines the United States and the democratic world as enemies and mandates a permanent ideological war against them. As long as that ideology remains intact, replacing individual leaders cannot fundamentally change the regime’s behavior. Real change requires dismantling the ideological structures themselves.
Historically, successful regime change has occurred in two stages: total defeat followed by systematic dismantling.
The first stage is the regime’s collapse and unconditional surrender. In Germany and Japan, this occurred through military defeat; in the Soviet Union, through a combination of internal dissent and the peaceful offensive of the democratic world.
Completion of this stage already produces a major strategic improvement, but it doesn’t yet guarantee the emergence of a democratic system.
For that purpose, the second stage — the dismantling of the regime’s institutions and ideology — is required. This process was carried out most systematically in Germany after World War II, when Allied authorities dismantled the Nazi Party and its security apparatus, prosecuted its leaders at Nuremberg, investigated millions connected with the regime and excluded compromised individuals from positions of authority. Denazification then worked to eliminate the ideology’s influence from society.
In the post-Soviet world, this second stage was implemented unevenly. Poland and Czechoslovakia removed communist structures and brought former dissidents into leadership. Russia didn’t. Many Soviet institutions remained intact, and former communist and KGB officials dominated the new political system.
Nevertheless, because the first stage was completed across the Soviet empire, the strategic outcome was overwhelmingly positive. Instead of confronting a monolithic communist superpower, the U.S. gained a number of democratic allies, and even Russia became weaker than the Soviet Union had been.
The lessons for Iran are clear.
The first stage, the collapse and surrender of the regime, has not yet occurred. If the conflict ends before that point, the result could actually strengthen the regime. Iran’s leaders could portray survival as a victory over their principal adversaries: the “Great Satan” and the “Little Satan,” as they call the U.S. and Israel, respectively.
History offers a warning. Despite losing nearly 30 million people in World War II, the Soviet communist regime emerged stronger, rebuilt its military power and expanded across Europe and Asia.
A totalitarian regime cannot be weakened by military means. Force will either destroy or strengthen it.
Some assume that even if the United States disengages before the regime collapses, the Iranian opposition will finish the task. That is unrealistic. A regime that survives confrontation with its principal adversaries will likely emerge stronger.
The strategic logic is therefore simple: If the confrontation ends with the collapse and unconditional surrender of the Iranian regime, then that will represent a clear victory for the U.S. and its allies. If it ends with the regime still in power, then Iran will be able to claim victory and rebuild its strength.
This argument shouldn’t be misunderstood. It doesn’t claim that the present conflict should necessarily have been initiated, nor that the United States must pursue regime change regardless of political circumstances. Those questions depend on judgments about timing, capabilities and public support.
The point here is analytical. Once a confrontation with a totalitarian regime has begun, stopping before the regime collapses risks turning tactical success into strategic defeat.
Regime change is not a moral slogan or a strategic instrument. When applied to totalitarian systems under the right conditions, and carried through to completion, it has repeatedly reshaped the international system for the better.
The policy is neither simple nor inexpensive, but history shows that abandoning regime change halfway is often the most costly option of all.
• Yuri Yarim-Agaev is president of the Center for the Study of Totalitarian Ideology and a former Soviet dissident.
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