What the U.S. can learn from Ukraine about beating Iran’s drones

KYIV, Ukraine — Mykhailo Fedorov, just weeks into his tenure as defense minister, is already signaling a shift in how Kyiv plans to manage its war with Russia: less bureaucratic oversight, more data-driven management and a new emphasis on leveraging Ukraine’s hard-won expertise in defeating Iran’s Shahed drones.

Whether Mr. Fedorov can spearhead a true strategic shift in the troubled administration of President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, however, remains to be seen.

“The arrival of Fedorov symbolizes first of all a different style of management,” said Hanna Shelest, a security analyst and director of the Ukrainian security studies program at the Foreign Policy Council “Ukrainian Prism.” “We cannot yet say this is a genuine strategic shift. We need to see results first and what he will actually be able to deliver.”

Mr. Fedorov, previously Ukraine’s minister for digital transformation, was appointed defense chief in January with a mandate to modernize the ministry during a war that has increasingly become a contest of technology, logistics and industrial capacity.

Unlike his predecessor, Rustem Umerov, whose responsibilities included sensitive diplomatic negotiations alongside running the ministry, Mr. Fedorov is expected to focus primarily on internal reform and the technological modernization of the armed forces.

“We definitely expect more of a project management style,” said Ms. Shelest, describing Mr. Fedorov’s approach as driven by analytics and a “startup-type mindset.”

She cautioned that transforming a wartime ministry can’t happen overnight.

“The Ministry of Defense during war is a huge system. His previous ministry was much smaller and more agile. We need time to see whether his management methods will work in such a large institution,” she said.

Drones and data

Unmanned systems now dominate much of the fighting along Ukraine’s sprawling front line, as drones conduct reconnaissance, guide artillery fire, strike armored vehicles and attack logistics hubs far behind the battlefield. Both sides are now deploying thousands of unmanned aircraft every month.

Ukraine has made drones a central pillar of its strategy. Government officials say the country produced or procured more than 1 million drones in 2024, and Kyiv has announced plans to further expand domestic production.

Mr. Fedorov’s arrival at the Defense Ministry appears designed to accelerate that technological momentum.

Oleksandr Kardakov, founder of Ukrainian defense technology firm Octava Defense and a longtime figure in the country’s information technology industry, said the new minister’s background gives him a distinct advantage.

“Fedorov clearly knows how to set strategic goals and manage the process of achieving them,” Mr. Kardakov said. “Unlike his predecessors as minister of defense, he has a strong technical background, which is particularly important if Ukraine is to win the war through technological means.”

One of the major challenges now facing the ministry is organizing Ukraine’s rapidly expanding defense technology ecosystem.

Since the start of Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022, hundreds of small companies and startups have entered the market for military drones and battlefield technology. That surge has produced remarkable innovation, but also fragmentation.

Mr. Kardakov said the next stage should focus less on creating entirely new prototypes and more on scaling the systems that already work.

“After four years of war, it makes sense to select the most effective models and technologies and scale their production,” he said.

Historical precedent suggests how such a transition could work. During World War II, more than 10 factories built the American M4 Sherman tank using standardized engineering documentation. Hundreds of smaller companies produced components.

“The same principle applies here,” Mr. Kardakov said. “Ukraine needs coordination centers that can consolidate technologies, bring together manufacturers, introduce industry standards and help scale the best solutions.”

The Shahed killers

One of the most promising developments in Ukraine’s defense technology push is the emergence of interceptor drones, designed to destroy hostile unmanned aircraft in flight.

Ukrainian engineers have been experimenting with several models capable of chasing down reconnaissance drones and the Iranian-designed Shahed attack drones that Russia frequently uses to strike Ukrainian cities and energy infrastructure.

Instead of relying exclusively on expensive missile-based air defense systems, interceptor drones pursue enemy drones directly and destroy them through collision or a small explosive charge.

The concept could significantly reduce the cost of defending against mass drone attacks.

Traditional air defense interceptors, such as Patriot missiles, can cost hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars per shot. The drones they are designed to destroy may cost only tens of thousands of dollars.

Interceptor drones offer a far cheaper option for defending cities and infrastructure against large swarms of unmanned aircraft.

Ukraine’s experience fighting Iranian-designed drones has drawn the attention of foreign militaries.

“For our Western partners, it should symbolize only one thing: Ukraine already has this experience,” Ms. Shelest said. “Many countries have purchased very advanced equipment but still struggle to deal with relatively simple drones. Ukraine has had to adapt much faster.”

That experience could prove valuable well beyond Eastern Europe.

Iranian-designed drones have been used not only in Ukraine but also in conflicts across the Middle East. The United States and Persian Gulf countries such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have repeatedly faced attacks from Iranian-backed forces using similar unmanned systems.

Military planners in Washington and the Gulf are increasingly exploring layered defenses that combine traditional missile systems with cheaper counter-drone technologies, including electronic warfare, directed-energy weapons and interceptor drones.

Ukraine’s battlefield innovations could provide practical lessons for that evolving defensive architecture.

Technology’s limits

Analysts warn that an overemphasis on cutting-edge technology carries risks.

“There is always a danger that the focus becomes too heavily concentrated on new things — drones, artificial intelligence and other high-tech tools,” Ms. Shelest said. “But the war still requires logistics, ammunition, tanks and all the traditional elements of warfare.”

Finding the right balance between innovation and traditional military capabilities will likely be one of the new minister’s greatest challenges.

Ukraine’s armed forces now include more than 1 million personnel. Supplying that force with ammunition, vehicles, equipment and spare parts remains the core responsibility of the Defense Ministry.

Digital tools and data analytics could help manage that enormous logistical burden, Ms. Shelest said, but they cannot replace the fundamentals of wartime supply.

Still, Ukraine’s defense industry leaders say the country has a rare opportunity to transform its wartime innovations into lasting strategic advantages.

“If the ministry works effectively with the private sector and applies its experience correctly, Ukraine can achieve technological dominance on the battlefield,” Mr. Kardakov said.

For now, Mr. Fedorov is betting that faster innovation cycles, closer cooperation with industry and a more data-driven military bureaucracy will help offset Russia’s advantages in manpower and heavy equipment.

Whether that bet succeeds could shape not only the outcome of the war in Ukraine but also how Western militaries prepare for conflicts increasingly defined by drones, digital warfare and rapid technological change.