- Wednesday, January 28, 2026

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President Trump’s interest in acquiring Greenland reflects a strategic foresight essential for America’s future security.

The world is entering a new era of great power competition, and the Arctic is the next major theater of that competition, with Greenland its most strategically valuable territory. Russia and China recognize this and are rapidly moving to claim their place.

Rich in rare earth minerals, Greenland is the strategic high ground of its region, a natural frozen island fortress that offers unparalleled advantages for scientific, military and intelligence operations.



Rare earth minerals are key to maintaining our technological superiority. They are used in essentials such as smartphones and guided missile systems. Most of these minerals are mined in China, whose interest in Greenland presents an opportunity to corner these markets.

The development of the Arctic is one of Russia’s key national priorities. The area also controls the vital northern missile corridor into the U.S.

Russia’s Arctic ambitions present an existential threat to U.S. security interests. Moscow maintains the world’s only fleet of nuclear-powered icebreakers and has reopened Soviet-era military bases across its own Arctic territories.

Russia’s fleet of polar icebreakers is the largest in the world and is used to exploit and develop the Northern Sea Route. This lucrative commercial and military sea lane is fast becoming one of the world’s most strategic corridors. It lies within Russia’s exclusive economic zone.

China’s Arctic ambitions are relatively new but equally ominous. Beijing recognized the importance of this vast land and, in 2018, declared itself a “near-Arctic state” despite having no geographic connection whatsoever to the Arctic. It had previously declared its quest to become a “major polar power.” To this end, China is expanding its fleet of polar icebreakers and has deployed existing icebreakers to the Arctic.

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Chinese ports are preparing to open Arctic shipping routes to Northern Europe through the Northern Sea Route. Iceland was the first European country to sign a free trade agreement with China, and the Chinese diplomatic mission there is the largest in the country.

China also has ambitions to develop a “polar Silk Road” in the region. In Greenland, Chinese companies have attempted to buy abandoned naval bases, invest in airport construction and secure mining rights for rare earth minerals.

Moscow and Beijing recently formalized years of collaboration in the Arctic by signing far-reaching agreements to jointly develop the Northern Sea Route. Their joint operations in the region complement each other’s strategic interests. They don’t think in terms of four-year election cycles. Instead, their focus is on permanent geopolitical advantages. Greenland is a key prize worth geopolitical risk.

Canada, whose Arctic boundaries are expansive, presents no military or diplomatic deterrent. Canadian military forces are small and inadequate, and the vast majority rely mostly on protection from the United States. Furthermore, the current Canadian government continues to flirt with China on matters of trade and is unlikely to take a stand on Arctic security.

Without a U.S.-controlled Greenland, we might wake up one day to discover that critical mineral mines are Chinese-owned and that strategic shipping routes through the Arctic are controlled by 45 Russian icebreakers — not to mention the threat of advanced Russian and Chinese ballistic, hypersonic and cruise missiles positioned in the region.

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As an American-controlled territory, Greenland would open a new frontier for economic investment and opportunity. From sustainable fishing and mining to high-tech research and tourism, the economic potential for its 56,000 residents is as vast as it is undeveloped.

It also creates dynamic opportunities and a win-win-win scenario for Denmark, the United States and Greenland, grounded in thoughtful strategic realism.

Denmark would be relieved of its substantial economic subsidy; the U.S. would invest billions of dollars in infrastructure, defense and economic development; and Greenlanders would receive greater security and significant economic and financial opportunities. Furthermore, NATO could continue to be a part of Greenland’s defense equation.

If Greenlanders prefer to remain under Danish sovereignty, that is their right, but they should also be presented with the opportunity to accept the benefits of a new geopolitical arrangement. If they opt for the security, prosperity and far-reaching opportunities afforded by American citizenship, then the U.S. should make available an attractive option.

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Perhaps a territorial designation like that of Guam, American Samoa, the Northern Mariana Islands or the U.S. Virgin Islands (a former Danish colony) could be established.

Another option could create a compact of free association with the U.S. There is precedent for this, and we know how to make it work. Greenland’s cultural and linguistic autonomy would be preserved under a U.S. umbrella.

President Trump’s strategic instincts in Greenland are correct. His vision of shared security and prosperity opens the door to this important and timely geopolitical discussion. His meeting with NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte has been described as productive, with a positive outcome in sight. A U.S.-Danish-Greenlandic working group has been established to discuss the realm of the possible, which is an excellent place to start.

The U.S. attempted to acquire Greenland in 1867, 1910 and 1946. Now it’s up to the diplomats to do what they do best: find acceptable, negotiated solutions that promote our shared economic and security interests. Rest assured, Moscow and Beijing will be watching eagerly.

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• Emilio T. Gonzalez is a retired intelligence officer who has served in senior positions in the U.S. Army, on the National Security Council and in the Department of Homeland Security.

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