OPINION:
As Iranians continue to demonstrate in the streets, facing down the brutality of the Islamic regime, President Trump mulls strikes that would have far-reaching implications.
I’ve been a strong proponent of the protests in Iran and the push toward a new government, but regime change is not an outcome. It is an event, and what follows matters far more than how it begins. We must remain sober-minded and realistic about the results.
The Islamic Republic of Iran is not merely another authoritarian state facing unrest. It has built its regional power structure around proxy warfare, Shiite fundamentalism and nuclear brinkmanship. Any major political rupture in Tehran would reverberate far beyond Iran itself.
Iran’s protest movement is not a single force marching toward a common political end. It is a convergence of grievances. Ethnic minorities, urban students, shopkeepers, women and disaffected conservatives are drawn together by anger toward the regime rather than agreement about what should replace it. There is not a united plan for what follows.
The dream scenario is easy enough to imagine. The clerical regime falls. Students are no longer shot in the streets. A democratic government takes hold, or perhaps the crown prince is reinstalled, sanctions are lifted, and the economy begins to recover. Tehran abandons revolutionary ideology and rebuilds as an open and tolerant society.
In this vision, Iran dismantles its proxy network. Hezbollah, Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, the Houthis and militias in Iraq and Syria lose funding and direction. Israel’s multifront threat collapses almost overnight.
International nuclear inspectors gain full access and transparency. Enrichment stops, and the program is dismantled. Iran restores relations with Europe, the United States and its Gulf neighbors, maybe even Israel. The dystopian chapter, at last, comes to an end.
History, however, presents a different possible outcome.
The collapse of centralized authority in Syria did not yield liberal democracy. It empowered armed groups with jihadi pasts, some of which simply rebranded. Over time, parts of that system learned to bargain and to moderate tactically. They engaged at opportune moments with Western and regional powers, but they did not disarm.
True reform in Iran is aspirational, but if the regime falls, it’s apt to look less like Eastern Europe in 1989 and more like Syria after President Bashar Assad’s grip weakened. One authoritarian system will replace another, under a different banner.
A successor regime may not necessarily frame hostility toward the West as a religious imperative. It may be more pragmatic as it seeks sanctions relief and internal stabilization. It may even tolerate discreet coordination with the United States and Israel on limited security matters, when interests briefly align.
It also could well remain under Islamic authoritarianism, preserve elements of Iran’s military infrastructure, and maintain relationships with proxy groups, even if those ties are restructured or temporarily restrained.
For the United States and Israel, this would not be a clear victory but a managed risk. The nuclear issue could well remain unresolved. A new regime may accept inspections as leverage rather than as a commitment to disarmament. Enrichment may slow, but the Iranian quest for nuclear capability will not disappear.
Proxy networks will also not collapse cleanly. They are likely to splinter. Some groups will go rogue, while others are folded into systems of state influence, such as Turkey’s. The risk will shift from coordinated Iranian warfare to something harder to pinpoint and deter.
There would also be diplomatic consequences for Israel beyond Iran itself. As the Iranian threat recedes, some Abraham Accords countries may reassess their strategic alignment with Israel, weakening the security rationale that originally underpinned normalization. It may also weaken the impetus for more countries to join in the future.
The early phase after the Iranian regime collapses is likely to be the most disruptive for Israel. Israeli intelligence channels in Iran, on which the United States also relies, are likely to degrade as institutions fragment and new power centers emerge. Gaps in understanding will inevitably widen. Strategic miscalculation could follow. Although the current regime is an existential threat to Israel, it’s also the devil they know.
A mistake now would be to assume that the fall of the ayatollahs guarantees the end of Iran as a strategic threat. The more realistic task is to prepare for a successor regime that is less ideological and more transactional but still dangerous.
• Joan Leslie McGill is executive director of the U.S.-Israel Education Association, where she leads efforts to educate and engage policymakers on the strategic importance of the U.S.-Israel relationship.
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