Moscow talking tough on Iran, but Russia’s grip on the Middle East has slipped

LONDON — Moscow has issued a sharp warning against any external intervention as the Trump administration weighs new military action against Iran in support of the regime’s protesters, but the Kremlin’s influence in the region is at its lowest point since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Once a key power broker from Algeria to Iran, Russia is now reduced to transactional diplomacy and largely symbolic military posturing.

“Those who plan to use externally inspired unrest as a pretext for repeating the aggression against Iran committed in June 2025 must be aware of the disastrous consequences of such actions for the situation in the Middle East and global international security,” the Russian Foreign Ministry said in a statement last week.

Iran is Russia’s closest ally in the Middle East and a de facto ally in Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. The Islamic republic has sent Russian President Vladimir Putin much-needed drones and other military assistance to feed the Russian leader’s war machine in Ukraine. Still, Russia’s ability and willingness to actively support its interests in the Middle East are a fraction of what they were.

“Russia has dramatically lost influence in the Middle East,” said Maximilian Hess, a Russia expert and the founder of Ementena Advisory, an international firm that assesses global financial risks for its clients. “If the uprising in Iran continues, Putin is more likely to intervene in a manner aimed at causing jitters in the oil market than he is by intervening directly in support of the ayatollah’s regime.”

Russia’s shift from its Middle East allies to the resource-draining campaign against Ukraine limits how aggressively Iranian leaders can respond to the potential U.S. threat. Tehran, for example, is unlikely to acquire more Russian air defense systems. Iran’s current air defense systems, many originating in Russia, were largely destroyed in a series of Israeli-U.S. strikes in June.

In December, Iran’s neighbor Turkey announced plans to return its Russian-made S-400 systems, a public repudiation of Moscow’s prestige in the region. Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400, starting in 2019, directly triggered its suspension from the Pentagon’s F-35 program. Now, Turkey, with the second-largest military in NATO, is in talks with the Trump administration to rejoin the F-35 program.

“Vladimir Putin is all but certain to seek to use potential Middle Eastern tumult to try and secure transactional deals with regional leaders as well as for economic benefit, something increasingly important as Putin’s economy strains under his war lust and sanctions,” Mr. Hess said.

In another setback, Iraq moved this month to nationalize Russian assets. The Iraqi Cabinet approved the nationalization of West Qurna 2, one of the world’s largest oil fields. Russia’s Lukoil held a 75% stake in the field, but U.S. sanctions made operations difficult.

“Russian companies are now rebranding and localizing operations,” said Sarwan Dawoodi, CEO of Uy Scuti, an Iraqi firm involved in the oil industry. “They are forming partnerships with local firms to operate under new names to avoid the sanctions, for example, Gazprom operating as ‘Garmian Petroleum,’ showing Moscow is shifting to a quieter, more commercial strategy to maintain its presence in the region.”

Gazprom is Russia’s state-owned energy firm.

West Qurna 2 produces nearly half a million barrels daily, equivalent to roughly 0.5% of global oil supply and 9% of Iraq’s total oil output. Russia won the contract in 2009 and entered into a partnership on the field with Norway’s Statoil.

“The existence of major Russian companies is not the end of Russian influence in the Middle East,” said Majid al-Qaysi, a retired general and director of intelligence analysis with the Iraqi army, “but it does represent another strong blow in a series of setbacks dating back to the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.”   

The fall of Syrian strongman Bashar Assad a year ago has put the future of Russia’s biggest assets in Syria, Khmeimim Air Base and the Tartus naval facility, in doubt.

Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa, who has struck up an unlikely alliance with President Trump, has also promised Russia he will honor previous agreements. It gives Damascus leverage to persuade the Russians to extradite Mr. Assad, who fled to Moscow when his regime fell.

Although a diplomatic long shot, a public trial of the country’s brutal former leader would dramatically bolster the new Syrian government’s legitimacy.

“Russia went from a strong player in the region to a pragmatic player who is looking to quick wins and to maintain its presence even if it’s largely symbolic,” Mr. al-Qaysi said.

A “Russia-Arab world” summit planned for October had to be canceled because of a lack of interest from Arab countries, another clear sign of Moscow’s declining pull.

“Putin views Russia as a ‘civilizational power.’ This has led it to prioritize Ukraine,” said Lynette Nusbacher, a former intelligence adviser to the British government. “This makes their Middle East position optional, and because Russia depends on China, Russia is less able to challenge China in the Gulf.”

Shared interests, such as oil and gas producers, help Russia maintain relatively strong ties with Oman and Qatar.

Oman granted visa-free travel to Russia last year, and Qatar has negotiated some humanitarian exchanges between Ukraine and Russia.

Russia’s stealth fighter, the Sukhoi Su-57 Felon, was the star of the Dubai Airshow 2025, where it wowed onlookers with aerobatic stunts, although its supposed stealth capabilities were not on display.

Its appearance in the Dubai market was only its third, after the Aero India and Zhuhai air shows. Russia kept its pavilion separate from other nations at the Dubai Airshow and told The Washington Times that it had received multiple business inquiries.

Russia has maintained its ambitions in the Middle East, but its ability to realize them has declined noticeably. The Kremlin is still issuing warnings, but sanctions and economic constraints have rendered Russia capable of doing little else.