Congress requires Pentagon report on Chinese spying from Cuba

NEWS AND ANALYSIS:

The Pentagon must in coming months provide to Congress a report on China’s signals intelligence, or SIGINT, collection capabilities in Cuba, along with what is left of Russian technical spying activities on the communist-ruled island.

The latest defense policy legislation signed into law last month contains a provision requiring a report from the secretary of defense and director of national intelligence on “intelligence capabilities of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation in the Republic of Cuba.”

Intelligence analysts have until June to submit the report.

The report was required by senators concerned with the ability of China to conduct important electronic spying operations against U.S. military forces, now heavily engaged in the region as part of efforts to halt drug trafficking and oversee the remnants of the Maduro regime in Venezuela.

According to a congressional conference report on the National Defense Authorization Act, the report must include an assessment of the current SIGINT capabilities and their potential expansion, the counterintelligence risks linked to the spying system and the capabilities and resources of the Pentagon in countering the electronic spying by both China and Russia.

L.J. Eads, a former Air Force space network warfare analyst and SIGINT analyst, said Chinese electronic spying capabilities from Cuba and the region pose a major national security threat.

The recent military operation in Venezuela provided a rare opportunity for China’s spies to gather valuable data on American weapons and war fighting, he said.

From longtime SIGINT posts in Cuba and newer facilities in South America and the Caribbean, “Beijing had a front-row seat to observe the way the U.S. fights — not in theory, not in exercises, but in live conditions, under operational stress, with real command authorities, real data links and real tactical decision-making,” Mr. Eads said.

Current Chinese SIGINT bases in Cuba are located near Bejucal and Havana and are successors to the Soviet-era Lourdes intelligence complex that officials said in the past was capable of spying on communications throughout the region and deep into the southern U.S.

“These sites are optimized not for espionage theater but for passive collection: satellite communications, tactical data links, airborne and maritime command-and-control traffic and timing patterns that reveal far more than content alone ever could,” Mr. Eads said.

As modern warfare is now driven by weapons powered by networks, data links, command processes and communication protocols, the spying likely provided the Chinese military with valuable intelligence on how U.S. forces integrate communications, airborne assets, maritime elements, cyber coordination and coalition interfaces in real time — joint warfare that is a key U.S. military advantage and which China is trying to emulate.

“From a SIGINT perspective, this is gold,” Mr. Eads said. “The broader implication is uncomfortable but unavoidable: Hostile intelligence infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere is no longer a peripheral concern. It is an active, ongoing threat to U.S. war fighting advantage.”

Mr. Eads, founder of Data Abyss, said the Trump administration must counter the Chinese electronic spying by pressing regional states to remove Beijing’s SIGINT and space monitoring bases which pose a major national security threat.

Additionally, the Chinese facilities throughout the region also will support China’s factional orbital bombardment systems, or FOBS, by providing valuable data for future attacks.

A FOBS is a unique, space-based nuclear strike weapon tested by the Chinese military in 2021.

SIGINT stations in Cuba give China key collection sites for spying on military emissions, data critical for designing cyber, electronic warfare, and counterspace attacks on U.S. forces.

“Because of their proximity, Cuban SIGINT sites enable line-of-sight and near-field collection against U.S. airborne [intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance], maritime task groups, and space-to-ground communications, giving Beijing a level of signal fidelity that cannot be replicated from orbital platforms alone,” he said.

The sites are key components of what the military calls China’s “kill-chain” process that feeds data high-tech weapons obtained during U.S. military deployments.

“Off the Florida coast these sites can collect airborne data links, likely unencrypted comms and satellite comms that may traditionally be more secure in other regions,” Mr. Eads said, adding that it provides Beijing with “golden” military data.

Cold War document shows military chiefs sought U.S. purchase of Greenland

President Trump’s plan to acquire Greenland is not new. A 1956 document from the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff called for the U.S. to purchase Greenland for its strategic military value.

Adm. Arthur W. Radford, the chairman at the time, stated in a memorandum to Defense Secretary Charles W. Wilson that in 1955 the military chiefs voiced their view “emphasizing the strategic importance of Greenland and the military advantage to the United States of acquiring title to the area.”

“The U.S. military requirements in Greenland can be expected to increase in the future,” the admiral said. 

“Further, Greenland will probably assume even greater strategic significance with the advent of operational intercontinental ballistic missiles, not only as a likely area for basing elements of a system to defend against such weapons, but as a potential area for installing offensive missile units,” he said.

The chiefs at the time said the 1951 treaty with Denmark for U.S. basing rights was an essential military requirement “so long as Denmark is a cooperative partner in an effective NATO.”

“Nevertheless, the Joint Chiefs of Staff believe that it would be advantageous, from a military point of view, to accomplish one of the following which are listed in order of priority,” the memo said.

The first priority is to “obtain direct title through purchase of Greenland.” Other options included a long-term lease for all of Greenland or selected bases areas. The last option was to negotiate an agreement for the longer term use of bases.

Mr. Trump said in a post on Truth Social on Wednesday that the U.S. needs Greenland for “national security” and that Greenland is vital for the Golden Dome missile defense system being built.

He warned that if the U.S. does not take over the arctic island that Russia or China will and that “THAT IS NOT GOING TO HAPPEN!”

“Militarily, without the vast power of the United States, much of which I built during my first term, and am now bringing to a new and even higher level, NATO would not be an effective force or deterrent - Not even close!,” Mr. Trump said, adding that NATO will be more effective with Greenland in U.S. hands.

“Anything less than that is unacceptable,” he said.

Cotton: China threatens U.S. AI development

The presence of thousands of Chinese nationals at Energy Department laboratories and facilities increases the risk of theft of critical national security information on the U.S. high-priority artificial intelligence development program, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence Chairman Tom Cotton and 10 other Republican senators warned Energy Secretary Chris Wright this week.

The Arkansas Republican organized a letter sent Tuesday urging the expulsion of thousands of Chinese nationals or resident aliens who work in or visit Energy facilities, noting their links to the Beijing government will undermine the Trump administration’s “Genesis Mission” — a Manhattan Project-like effort to achieve American dominance in artificial intelligence.

“We are concerned … that the thousands of Chinese foreign nationals who are granted access to, or work at, our labs could compromise Genesis Mission, and we urge you to take the necessary steps to protect it,” the senators said.

“China is our main competitor in the race for AI dominance, a position it occupies only because it has stolen American intellectual property and technologies and co-opted them over the years.”

China in the 1990s carried out large-scale espionage operations against Energy Department nuclear weapons laboratories. The spying resulted in the loss of secrets on all deployed U.S. nuclear warheads, according to the CIA.

The senators said that despite the past compromises, continued access by Chinese national scientists to the laboratories, where the best and brightest U.S. scientists work on critical military, economic and scientific technologies, must end, the letter said.

In recent years as many as 3,200 Chinese nationals were approved for access to U.S. national laboratories, along with their information and technology.

“This number does not include those with lawful permanent resident status, which means there are likely hundreds, perhaps thousands, more individual Chinese citizens working in our labs,” the letter said.

Security vetting of the Chinese is insufficient and can overwhelm the Energy’s intelligence and counterintelligence screeners. Vetting also will be unable to identify the scientists and their affiliations with the 98 million-member Chinese Communist Party, whose members can be tasked with stealing foreign know-how, the letter said.

Also, Chinese scientists and researchers ostensibly not linked to the Beijing government “can be compelled in one way or another by the regime to turn over what they have learned during their time at a national laboratory,” the letter said.

“Continuing to give access to the cutting-edge work performed at these laboratories to Chinese nationals who will turn everything they know over to the CCP directly undermines the purpose of Genesis Mission,” the letter says.

“Therefore, we respectfully recommend that you mitigate threats to Genesis Mission by promulgating a policy prohibiting the national laboratories from granting Chinese nationals access to any national laboratory site, information, or technology.”

 

• Contact Bill Gertz on X @BillGertz.