- The Washington Times - Thursday, January 1, 2026

SEOUL, South Korea — Taiwanese President Lai Ching-te on Thursday emphasized defense to build “a safer and more resilient Taiwan” amid Chinese aggression, after Beijing completed days of live-fire military exercises near the democratically run island.

“In the face of China’s rising expansionary ambitions, the international community is paying attention to whether the Taiwanese people possess the resolve for self-defense,” Mr. Lai said in his New Year’s Day address, titled “Island of Resilience — Light of Hope” and posted on the presidential website.

His remarks followed those of Chinese President Xi Jinping, who reiterated his determination to incorporate Taiwan as part of the mainland in his own televised address on New Year’s Eve.



“We Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait share a bond of blood and kinship,” Mr. Xi said. “The reunification of our motherland, a trend of the times, is unstoppable!”

He also reminded his citizens that the Chinese Communist Party had designated “Taiwan Recovery Day” on Oct. 24.

Beijing has not laid out a date for Taiwan’s “reunification,” but U.S. military and intelligence sources are convinced the Peoples Liberation Army has been tasked with being fully invasion-capable in 2027.

U.S. officials and arms dealers in the region have long lambasted Taipei’s low defense budgets. U.S. Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Elbridge Colby said Taiwan should be spending 10% of its GDP on defense in his Senate confirmation hearing in March.

That may be excessive: NATO countries, with the world’s most kinetic war underway on their doorstep, are expected to spend just 2%, though under June’s Hague Investment Plan, have pledged to raise that to 5% by 2035.

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Taiwan, facing a cross-Strait existential threat, has been slow to accelerate arms purchases. In 2025, the country’s defense spend was 2.38% of GDP; that is set to rise to 3.32 in 2026. Mr. Lai expects the figure to rise further to 5% by 2030, though his term ends in 2028 and the opposition has stymied some of his budget proposals.

In November, Mr. Lai laid out a $40 billion special defense budget to “comprehensively upgrade our combat capabilities and strengthen our defence industry,” he said Thursday.

The industry needs work. Taiwan’s first domestically-produced submarine, a “Hai Kun/Narwhal”-class attack boat, suffered hydraulic problems that froze its helm during sea trials in June.

Facing overwhelming conventional odds, some Taiwanese commanders are thinking asymmetrically.

Amid the Chinese drills, Taiwanese engineers floated explosive barrels — improvised marine mines — in the mouth of the Tamsui River. That river leads from “Red Beach” on the Taiwan Strait into downtown Taipei — an ideal, if obvious, channel for a commando strike on Taipei’s leadership.

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Chinese military experts quoted in mainland media said China’s recent drills practiced four capabilities.

“Fire control” is the ability to annihilate targets across and around the island with long-range fires. “Blockade” refers to the aerial-naval ability to close off Taiwan’s ports and airspace to friendly forces.

“Precision strike” references the ability to fire highly precise, rather than barrage weaponry, while “decapitation” refers to the liquidation of political or military leaders.

China’s alarming military ambitions’

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Whether Taiwanese troops are prepared to resist an overwhelmingly superior enemy is up for debate.

Local males serve just one year in the military — an increase from a mere four months prior to 2022, when service was extended. 

According to Global Firepower, Taiwan fields 215,000 active-service troops while China fields almost ten times that number: 2,035,000, overwhelmingly volunteers. Though Taiwan boasts another 2.3 million reservists on paper, their training and readiness has been widely questioned.

At issue is civil capacity for resistance. Many middle-class Taiwanese, alarmed at China’s bellicosity, take private classes in survival - but not combat. The country has strict laws on gun ownership, restricting tactical training for civilians to airsoft gaming.

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No national militia of the kind that took on a major share of the defense of Kiev and Kharkiv in the early days of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine exists.

Mr. Lai in 2025 announced “17 major national security strategies to combat infiltration” and said Friday that he would “accelerate amendments to 10 national security laws.”

With a combative opposition controlling the Legislative Yuan, that may prove difficult. Mr. Lai pleaded with his political opponents to get onside.

“Facing China’s alarming military ambitions, Taiwan has no time to wait and certainly no time to consume ourselves with internal strife,” he implored. “We may hold different view on military issues, but without strong and resilient national defense, there will be no country, nor will there by space allowed for us to debate.”

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“This should be a national consensus across party lines” he continued. “I hope the ruling and opposition parties can work together to swiftly pass this crucial national defense budget.”

Given recent political developments, that may be unrealistic.

In summer 2025, Mr. Lai’s supporters — with his endorsement - attempted to overthrow 31 opposition lawmakers with an unprecedented recall vote. It failed completely.

In December, the opposition shot back with another first for Taiwan politics: It initiated impeachment proceedings against Mr. Lai.

It looks doomed to fail. Mr. Lai’s ruling holds 52 seats in the Yuan, while the opposition hold 59; 75 votes are required to dump him.

Even so, it is a signals how toxic politics are at present.

There is some good news for Mr. Lai. Though Taiwan has no official allies, Beijing’s hostile mention of “external forces” in its recent drills likely reference regional U.S.-allied democracies that are geographically positioned to assist in Taiwan’s defense.

Key maritime choke points on both sides of Taiwan — the Bashi Channel north of the Philippines, and the Miyako Strait southwest of Japan — are potential bulwarks against Chinese naval blockades or encirclements.

In 2025, U.S troops drilled with local forces on key terrain in both locations and practiced the deployment of mobile Typhoon and NMESIS Naval Strike Missile platforms. Both are area-denial weapons.

In December, Washington also announced a record $11 billion arms package for Taipei, raising Beijing’s ire.

In November, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi officially confirmed to the Diet that a naval contingency off Taiwan would present an “existential threat” to Japan. That would mean the automatic activation of Japanese Self Defense Forces.

These various deterrent factors raise risks for PLA war planners by increasing the likely costs of any “Taiwan Recovery” operation.

The PLA “are preparing and they’d like to have the capability to do so, but haven’t made the decision yet,” said a source familiar with regional weaponry, speaking off-record. “On the other side of the coin, the U.S. is seriously concerned about the costs of intervention, due to China’s accrued capability.”

Moreover, Beijing’s coercive stance may be causing its own form of blowback.

“The chain of intimidation has bought about is China’s isolation and the reinforcement of an international encirclement network,” former Japanese lawmaker Naomi Tokashiki posted on X, accompanied by a map showing the extent of the recent PLA exercises. “Isn’t it about time to recognize the reality that there is nothing to be gained from attempting to change the status quo through force?”

“The final piece here is Japan,” added the anonymous source. “We keep framing the Taiwan issue as a U.S./China issue, but the Japanese are now expressing openly what they have been quietly concerned about.”

• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.

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