North Korean troops rejoin Russia in the war on Ukraine, according to Kyiv intelligence reports

SEOUL, South Korea — North Korean troops have returned to combat in the Ukraine war, firing tube and rocket artillery into Ukraine across the Russian border, Kyiv’s intelligence has revealed.

North Korean shock troops fought alongside Russian units from late 2024 until March 2025. Information that North Korean artillery has rejoined the conflict was provided by the Defense Intelligence of Ukraine, or DIU, on Wednesday and reported by Kyiv-based media.

Per the reports, North Korean artillery units, operating both howitzers and multiple-launch rocket systems, have been operating under Russian command in Kursk since January. 

From those positions on Russian soil, the North Korean gunners are shooting at targets over the Ukrainian border, using aerial assets to spot and correct their fire.

The DIU said a key reason for North Korean involvement in the war is to gain experience in modern operations. Though it did not specify the aerial reconnaissance methods, that is likely a reference to using drones — which have emerged as key assets in the conflict.

“Under the agreement between Moscow and Pyongyang, the rotation of military personnel stationed in the Kursk region is carried out regularly,” DIU reported.

In June 2024, Russian President Vladimir Putin and North Korean leader Kim Jong-un signed a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in Pyongyang. One of its provisions calls for one party to come to the other’s aid if invaded.

In August 2024, Kyiv’s cross-border incursion into Russia’s Kursk oblast appears to have triggered that clause.

While most global attention in recent years has focused on North Korea’s nuclear armory, South Korean analysts point to North Korea’s special forces and its massed artillery as highly potent conventional assets.

Special forces proved their worth during intense fighting in Kursk. Reports of artillery joining the battle suggest Pyongyang’s military aid to Moscow is moving into a new phase.

The alliance began in earnest with ordnance: massive shipments to Russia of artillery shells and tactical ballistic missiles from Pyongyang’s powerful military industrial complex.

But by the end of October 2024, North Korea was sending soldiers, adding a divisional-strength special forces grouping to Russia’s effort to eject the Ukrainian lodgment in Kursk.

After the Kursk battles ended in March, a third phase saw Korean People’s Army engineers engaging in demining and explosive ordnance disposal operations in Kursk.

The DIU did not state the number of KPA artillery pieces, nor their ranges. And while the DIU reports are not confirmed by other sources, there are grounds to respect their veracity.

Ukrainian intelligence was the first to report both the presence of North Korean munitions on the battlefield and the presence of North Korean special forces in Russia.

Pyongyang officially admitted its ground engagement only in April 2025 — six months after the first Ukrainian reports appeared.

Experience in modern warfare is seen by analysts as critically valuable for North Korean armed forces that have not fought a major conflict since the Korean War ended in 1953. 

Ongoing Ukrainian operations put Pyongyang’s military experience ahead of Seoul’s, which took nonkinetic roles in the Global War on Terror, but last undertook major combat operations in Vietnam in 1973. 

South Korean experts say there is reason for concern, especially when it comes to North Korea’s growing expertise with multiple-launch rocket systems.

“North Korea has really good capability in MLRS, it is a great threat against us: Their newest MLRS have a kind of giant, shotgun effect, and have longer ranges than conventional artillery,” said Jee Hong-ki, a retired South Korean artillery colonel. “If they can adapt themselves to that environment, they can develop their own capabilities using UAVs, which are a kind of game changer.”

Unmanned aerial vehicles, or UAVs, are the key military technology to emerge from the Ukraine conflict. Not only are they used in resupply, reconnaissance and strike roles, they upgrade fire accuracy.

Historically, artillery is the deadliest arm of war. Spotting targets and then adjusting fire are the tasks of forward observation officers and/or light aircraft. Drones can manage both tasks more safely than spotters and more economically than aircraft.

North Korea’s big guns represent Mr. Kim’s biggest conventional threat.

“If you are going to ask what are the top types of units that they field, and where they make their best investments, their artillery far out does their special operations forces,” said Bob Collins, a retired U.S. Forces Korea officer. “They put so much money into it and field so many artillery units, that I would put their artillery way above anything else.”

According to World Population Review’s Artillery-by-Country rankings, Mr. Kim’s Korean People’s Army deploys 11,920 pieces — inclusive of towed, self-propelled and MLRS units — second only to Russia, with 17, 629. 

According to the same data set, the United States fields 3,556 pieces.

North Korea’s gunnery includes long-range tubes dug into deep casements north of the DMZ that — using conventional, rather than specially propelled shells — can strike Seoul.  However, its field artillery has an Achilles Heel.

“Moving artillery along the front, or moving it forward, requires fuel and that is going to be one of their biggest weaknesses,” Mr. Collins said —though that weakness is moot in the current conflict. “They can rely on Russia for logistics.”

It is not just guns: North Korea also outpaces the U.S. in munition production capacity.

South Korean intelligence estimated that, as of July 2025, North Korea had supplied 12 million 152mm artillery shells to Russia. As of March 2025, per the U.S. State Department, the United States had supplied 3 million 155mm artillery shells to Ukraine

“Our weakness is that our businesses that make whatever are just there for the money, not for being loyal to the cause, as they were in World War II,” Mr. Collins said. The North Koreans, he said, “are making munitions for the cause.”

North Korean gunners’ use of drones may negate one of the most dangerous missions of Tier-1 commandos.

The estimated 10,000-13,000-strong North Korean contingent that fought in Kursk is part of Pyongyang’s 11th “Storm” Corps, a Tier-2 special forces unit roughly analogous to a U.S. Army Rangers unit.

In Kursk, Ukrainians found the 11th Corps men more cohesive than Russian troops, as well as fitter and better shots. 

However, in their early unsupported attacks, they suffered massive casualties. Most fought to the death — bodycam footage from Ukrainian troops showed wounded men committing suicide with hand grenades — and only two were captured.

In an interview with South Korean press, the pair said they were from the Reconnaissance General Bureau. The RGB is Pyongyang’s Tier-1 military intelligence unit tasked with deep reconnaissance and sabotage operations.

“Every unit needs forward observers and the RGB has a lot of those individuals,” said Mr. Collins, whose book, “Kim’s Treasured Sword: The Reconnaissance General Bureau,” will be published later this year. “So I was not surprised that they were from the RGB … brigades need people to spot.”