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OPINION:
Americans rightly view space exploration through a lens of pride and history. The Apollo era remains a defining national achievement, and any successful mission carrying American astronauts, especially Artemis II, should be celebrated as a triumph of skill, courage and engineering.
As citizens and taxpayers, we want Artemis II to succeed, but success alone is not a winning strategy when you’re an American.
The strategic question confronting our nation today is not whether we can return to the moon, but whether we can stay — affordably and at scale — while competing with a determined adversary that views space not as symbolism but as critical infrastructure.
China does not approach space exploration as a series of prestige missions. The Chinese Communist Party treats cislunar space as an extension of economic power, industrial capacity and long-term strategic advantage. Beijing is executing a coordinated national strategy that integrates civilian, commercial and military capabilities to shape the rules, norms and infrastructure governing the next era of space activity.
That distinction matters.
President Trump’s executive order Ensuring American Space Superiority recognizes this reality. It emphasizes timelines, acquisition reform, sustainability and cost-effectiveness — principles that matter far more than nostalgia-driven architecture such as NASA’s Space Launch System.
Winning the second space race requires aligning means with ends, not repeating legacy procurement mistakes that prize continuity over capability.
Even if Artemis II performs flawlessly whenever it launches, it will not change this central fact: The current government-built launch architecture is not designed for high cadence, rapid reuse or long-term affordability. Those attributes are what determine whether we can maintain leadership rather than merely visit the moon intermittently.
The Space Launch System was conceived in a different strategic era, built around expendable components and slow production timelines. After more than 13 years of development and more than $64 billion in expenditures, it has flown once. Artemis II will be only the second time.
Each launch carries a multibillion-dollar price tag and requires years of preparation. That model cannot support sustained presence, rapid iteration or strategic resilience in a competitive environment.
Federal watchdogs have already warned that the Space Launch System is unaffordable, and public opinion is increasingly reflecting this reality. In a December national survey of registered voters, nearly two-thirds said NASA should use modern, reusable rockets rather than traditional, single-use systems.
Voters understand what policymakers have been slow to accept: Reusability is not ideological; it is practical.
The same survey shows Americans are open to reforming how NASA acquires launch capabilities. When asked whether the government should continue relying on a single, government-owned rocket or instead purchase launch services from private providers if those providers can achieve better results at lower cost, voters leaned toward competitive procurement. That’s not an endorsement of any one company. Rather, it’s a mandate for consistent performance, best value and producing results.
Reusability is not merely about saving money. High-cadence systems improve safety through reputation and learning. They reduce vulnerability by enabling rapid reconstitution, and they support sustained operations rather than one-off missions.
These characteristics have profound national security implications. Launch cadence, not just lift capacity, defines who controls the tempo of activity in space.
China understands this. Beijing is mimicking its efforts on SpaceX’s Starship and is aggressively investing in reusable launch technologies, industrial scale-up and rapid iteration cycles. It recognizes that frequent, affordable access to space enables everything from satellite resilience to lunar logistics.
In contrast, architectures built around infrequent, bespoke launches lock us into a fragile posture, one that cedes leadership and dominance over time.
None of this diminishes the bravery of our astronauts or the dedication of engineers working on Artemis II. Their success should be applauded, but celebrating a mission must not become an excuse to perpetuate a system that cannot meet high demands.
Congress has an opportunity to draw a responsible line between honoring sunk costs and enabling future success. Artemis III can serve as a logical transition point, fulfilling near-term objectives while allowing policymakers to pivot from the Space Launch System and toward launch systems designed for reuse, rapid turnaround and sustained operations.
Continuing beyond that point with an expendable, low-cadence architecture would not be a commitment to leadership; it would be acceptance of decline.
The Trump administration should accelerate NASA’s reform, equipping the agency with a competitive architecture suited to great-power rivalry. The CCP is not pursuing symbolic achievements. It is maneuvering to dictate governance, standards and norms for lunar activities, resource use and the infrastructure shaping humanity’s next space era.
Winning the next space race will not be decided by a single launch but by whether we choose systems that allow it to lead consistently, sustainably and at scale. Artemis II should succeed, but America’s future on the lunar surface depends on what we choose to do right now.
• Stephen J. Yates served as deputy national security adviser to the vice president. He is a senior research fellow for China and national security policy at The Heritage Foundation.
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