OPINION:
President Trump is weighing whether to end the war even if the Strait of Hormuz is closed, a decision that will shape more than the end of this conflict.
Recent reporting suggests that Mr. Trump may be willing to stop short of forcing a reopening of the strait and rely instead on diplomacy and partners to restore shipping.
This isn’t just about how the war ends. It’s also about how it will be read in Tehran, in the Gulf States and beyond and what that will set into motion.
Tehran’s response to recent U.S. outreach makes its position clear. Iranian officials are not offering a compromise. They are setting conditions: removing American forces from the region, lifting sanctions, preserving their missile program and expanding control over the Strait of Hormuz.
Those demands would shift the balance of power in Iran’s favor.
Iran has also pointed to a regional framework that reduces the role of the U.S. and places itself closer to the center of regional security arrangements.
We have seen this logic before. After Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, Osama bin Laden offered to defend Saudi Arabia — on the condition that the kingdom reject American troops. The point wasn’t only security. It was also to push out the U.S. and replace it with a different kind of order.
Iran isn’t making the same offer, but it is moving in a similar direction by using pressure now and shaping what comes after it in ways that reduce the U.S. role.
If Washington steps back while Iran retains leverage over Hormuz, it will be felt across the region.
For Gulf states, this is already real. Countries such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar have long tried to balance reliance on American security and avoiding direct confrontation with Iran. That balance is now under strain.
Recent Iranian strikes have reached beyond a single front: hitting infrastructure, energy-linked sites and commercial routes. The message is clear enough.
At the same time, in Washington, the pressure to wrap this up is growing. Oil prices have moved up, and the risk of continued disruption in Hormuz is weighing on markets and policymakers alike.
Still, that doesn’t settle the issue.
The U.S. is not forced to choose between confronting Iran and stabilizing energy markets. Gulf states still have the capacity to ease supply pressures even as the conflict continues. Ending the war on the assumption that markets can’t absorb further disruption gives Tehran a say it shouldn’t have.
The real question is how Iran will read an American pullback. If U.S. policy is seen as responsive primarily to economic pressure, then Iran may conclude that escalation can force political concessions. That conclusion won’t stay confined to this conflict.
If Iran comes out of this war with its leverage intact, then governments in Saudi Arabia and the UAE will have to reconsider how much they can rely on Washington alone. Some will hedge more openly, while others will keep channels with Tehran they would rather not rely on.
That also creates room for other world players. Russia, already aligned with Iran, would have more space to expand its role. Turkey, which stayed out of the fighting, could emerge from it in a stronger position.
If Washington wants to avoid that outcome, then it needs to be clear about what ending this war requires. Hormuz cannot be left as a point of leverage. Iran’s ability to use it as a pressure point must be addressed, not deferred to diplomacy alone.
Walking away now won’t end the conflict. It will decide who comes out ahead.
• Bradley Martin is the executive director of the Near East Center for Strategic Studies. Follow him on Facebook and Twitter @ByBradleyMartin. Liram Koblentz-Stenzler is the head of the Global Extremism and Antisemitism Desk at the International Institute for Counter-Terrorism at Reichman University in Herzliya, Israel, and a visiting scholar at Brandeis University.
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