Does U.S. need Euro-Atlantic allies to help defend the Indo-Pacific?

SEOUL, South Korea — Britain’s King Charles III told President Trump during his state visit Wednesday, “Our AUKUS submarine partnership with Australia sets the benchmark for innovative and vital collaboration.”

Australian media reported that remark as a “kaboom” moment.

Under AUKUS — shorthand for the trilateral security agreement among Australia, the United Kingdom and the United States — Britain and the U.S. agreed to supply Australia with nuclear attack submarines.

The king’s reference is considered a not-too-subtle reminder to Mr. Trump, who has been noncommittal about delivering on a Biden administration pledge, that the British aren’t simply ceding the defense of their allies and interests in the Indo-Pacific to the Americans.

Disagreements between the Europeans and the U.S. over Ukraine’s defense are widely known, but a quieter controversy is brewing between the U.S. and its Western allies over the sense that the Americans are asking the Europeans to take a back seat on leadership and defense in the Pacific.

Some Washington figures have argued that NATO nations should aim their limited capabilities at Russia, puncturing European egos accustomed to global influence, but growing global skepticism about Mr. Trump’s “America First” policies has some Indo-Pacific capitals linking hands with Europe on defense partnerships and arms deals.

“The United States is historically Europe’s closest ally, and the Indo-Pacific is becoming increasingly important to European strategy,” the German Marshall Fund wrote on Sept. 11. “However … differing views and approaches within the U.S. administration, and uncertainty about Washington’s approach to China, make it particularly challenging for Europe to carve out room to maneuver as a security actor.”

From CRINK to CRNK?

Chinese President Xi Jinping, North Korean leader Kim Jong-un and Russian President Vladimir Putin were among the leaders who made up the front rank at Beijing’s military parade on Sept. 3 to commemorate the 80th anniversary of the end of World War II in the Pacific.

Conspicuously absent from prestige positioning was visiting Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian.

Iran is commonly lumped into the authoritarian bloc of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, sometimes referred to as CRINK but also known as “The Axis of Upheaval” or “The Axis of Authoritarianism.”

Iran’s military humiliation at the hands of U.S. and Israeli forces in June has shaken up the status quo.

“They got the hell knocked out of them recently,” said Grant Newsham, a former U.S. Marine officer and diplomat with wide experience in the Indo-Pacific.

Tehran proxies Hamas and Hezbollah have been degraded, and its air defenses were shattered, leaving nuclear sites at the mercy of Israeli and U.S. bombers, which sustained no losses in their operations.

Although Iran has been defanged for now, nuclear-armed China, North Korea and Russia represent a formidable triad.

All are Indo-Pacific powers with global presence.

Though Russia is fighting a bloody war on its European border, it maintains a significant military presence in the Far East.

Beijing also deploys a world-ranging naval fleet that has conducted drills with Russia as distant as the Indian Ocean.

Pyongyang has fought in Russia’s war against Ukraine and is receiving military, including maritime, technologies from a grateful Moscow.

Democracies struggle to respond

With its Atlantic and Pacific seaboards, America maintains a massive presence in the Indo-Pacific and has allies in Australia, Japan, the Philippines and South Korea. It also unofficially underwrites Taiwan’s defense.

Euro-Atlantic NATO members have small but active presences in the Indo-Pacific.

The U.S.-led U.N. Command, the free world states that defended South Korea in the 1950-1953 Korean War, includes representatives from Europe, including France and Britain.

Germany joined in 2024, a European officer said, “to get a bootprint in Indo-Pacific.”

Yet, barring the U.S., no U.N. Command states have mutual defense treaties with South Korea, nor do they have on-ground units.

Under the Proliferation Security Initiative, European warships have patrolled regional waters to oversee sanctions on North Korea.

Drills are another eastward call. Europe is increasingly sending forces to join regional exercises, such as Australia’s Pitch Black and Talisman Saber.

In recent years, midsize powers France, Italy and Britain have deployed carrier strike groups. These voyages are not just operational. Flight deck cocktail parties generate diplomatic/commercial public relations.

“Efforts at defense diplomacy — sending CSGs to demonstrate capabilities but also to boost potential weapons sales — show that Brits and Europeans have skin in the game,” said Alex Neill, a regional security expert at Pacific Forum. “But maybe the U.S. thinks it is a complicating effort and they would be better using those assets to defend closer shores.”

Whether European militaries deter Beijing’s or Pyongyang’s huge forces is questionable.

“I doubt Europeans have much to offer when it comes to Asia-Pacific since their militaries are just too small,” said Mr. Newsham. “They’re hard-pressed to take care of their own area, much less farther afield.”

European carrier strike groups could “backfill” U.S. strike groups departing the Euro-Atlantic for the Indo-Pacific. Some might fight, as the Royal Navy did alongside U.S. forces in World War II and the Korean War.

However, Defense Undersecretary Elbridge Colby has deprioritized the Atlantic for the Pacific.

He sought to delay shipments of weapons needed by Ukraine, but Mr. Trump overturned the decision.

Europe’s limitations

According to reports that were not refuted, Mr. Colby told British officials in May that their carrier strike group was not wanted in the Indo-Pacific.

Britons were apparently stunned: The eight-month, ongoing tour by the Royal Navy’s flagship is a high-prestige global mission for London.

The British carrier strike group has cooperated effectively with regional forces from India to Japan and with the U.S. Navy. On Sept. 12, a British frigate and a U.S. destroyer angered Beijing by transiting the Taiwan Strait.

The regional deployment exposed limitations.

“The Royal Navy can’t even put up a full CSG; it needs assistance from partner nations,” said Mr. Neill, referencing shortfalls in F-35s and surface escorts. “And you read about assets breaking down along the way.”

London may have caved to U.S. pressure.

In July, one of the lead drafters of Britain’s Strategic Defense Review told Parliament that “the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command … does not see much value in U.K. forces being based in the region,” leading to a British refocus on “the Atlantic bastion.”

Paris has stronger claims to regional presence and may be more resistant to Washington.

“The Brits and the EU constantly bang the drum about maintaining global order and freedom of navigation in Indo-Pacific,” said Mr. Neill. “France argues that they are a resident power in Indo-Pacific and has 2 million citizens living in the Indian Ocean and the Pacific.”

Mr. Colby placed the 2021 AUKUS under review in June with the logic that the U.S. Navy needed all the submarines U.S. yards could build.

If Washington quashes AUKUS, it would humiliate London and Canberra. Both have staked political and financial capital on the agreement.

However, a source familiar with regional security told The Washington Times that “Bridge [Colby] is losing steam.”

American and Australian media report that Secretary of State Marco Rubio has assured Australian officials that AUKUS will proceed.

Even so, “America First” is testing nerves among allies, and former U.S. collaborations are developing.

“Trump, perhaps unwittingly, has acted as a catalyst for greater European and Asian innovation by liberal democratic states in foreign and security policy,” said John Nilsson-Wright, an Asia expert at Cambridge University.

New partnerships

In 2023, Japan and Britain signed a legal-military deal enabling the swift, seamless deployment of troops and arms between the two nations.

Japan is working not with a U.S. defense contractor but with British and Italian partners to develop a sixth-generation stealth fighter.

Japan and South Korea are benefiting from their alliances with the U.S., which required them to use NATO-standard gear. This means their weapons firms can increasingly compete with the U.S. military-industrial complex.

Although neither Seoul nor Tokyo has armed Kyiv, Korean arms firms have benefited massively from the Russia-Ukraine war by selling arms worth tens of billions of dollars to NATO nations, including Estonia, Norway, Poland, Romania and Turkey.

Mr. Nilsson-Wright said multilateral defense linkages must be maintained or upgraded.

“A global commitment is required from middle-ranking powers,” he said, to “compensate for the long-term decline in U.S. influence.”