A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.
OPINION:
The recent visit of Army Secretary Daniel P. Driscoll and Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George to Ukraine could mark a watershed moment in embracing a more cost-conscious, responsive approach to arms development and acquisition.
Current U.S. military acquisition efforts and congressional interests frequently inhibit the ability to create the responsive, low-cost lethality required to excel on the modern battlefield.
For years, single-use consumable weapons have been purchased at costs significantly more than their targets. Making matters worse, weapons are often surpassed by adversary countermeasures before they ever reach the stockpile. American weapons, despite all the positive press, had short-lived utility in Ukraine. Weapons ranging from switchblades to JDAMs failed because of predictable Russian GPS interference. Planned mitigations would not succeed because of the proliferation and widespread dispersion of cheap, small jammers on the battlefield.
These painful lessons demand immediate attention to prevent costly failures in the future, but the U.S. has been slow to embrace this paradigm. Adversaries and friends alike are now adapting inexpensive, off-the-shelf solutions to meet time-sensitive emerging developments. The result of such rapid innovation is that exquisite Western technologies with long research, development, test and evaluation cycles become obsolete before ever reaching the field.
Timely calls for reform by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth and Mr. Driscoll may not go far enough. In modern warfare, the defense base is slow to embrace cost per kill and speed of adaptation, and the services are only now beginning to understand the criticality of these factors. Setting a one-year goal is not aggressive enough. Requirements and countermeasures change overnight. Systems and sourcing solutions must be flexible enough to engage in the cycle of escalating countermeasures.
Ukraine has, by necessity, provided a road map. It is employing the least expensive technology required to complete the task. Its advanced interceptors used to destroy the $10,000 to $30,000 Shaheed/Gerand one-way attack drones — battlefield-proven with thousands of kills — cost $1,250 to $2,500. By contrast, the U.S. Army recently awarded a $100 million contract for the Next Generation C-UAS Missile Program, where each interceptor reportedly costs approximately $200,000.
The coordination platform Brave1 is a driver of Ukrainian success. Bringing together all key players in the country’s defense technology sector, it provides “organizational, informational, and financial support to accelerate the development of innovative defense projects in Ukraine.” Brave1 integrates the defense bureaucracy into a single program.
“While in the U.S. or Europe, the path from idea to field deployment may take years, in Ukraine, thanks to direct interaction with the front line, this process can take only a few months — and sometimes even weeks,” a representative of Brave1 told Ukraine’s Arms Monitor. “We conduct R&D in real time — when a problem arises, we immediately bring developers together, test solutions on the battlefield, and implement them.”
Acquisition processes are governed by “cost, schedule, and performance.” The Defense Department should prioritize performance as the primary evaluation criterion, with a warfighter ultimately responsible for making final decisions. Operators frequently express concern that performers resist addressing newly identified vulnerabilities to avoid deviating from stringent guidelines. In reality, cost and schedule vastly outweigh performance. Warfighters possess a comprehensive understanding of the optimal trade-offs between mission objectives and cost, whereas most acquisition professionals lack this level of expertise.
Performance enhancements often result in protracted delays, affecting cost and schedule. Engaging a creative, innovative industry performer with a deep understanding of the battlefield and in-house tools and skills that enable rapid iteration could mitigate many of these challenges. Collectively, these components establish a model that allows rapid incorporation of operational employment data, quick transformation of metal into various forms and subsequent code refinement. This iterative process operates on a shorter time frame, measured in days and weeks rather than months and years.
Before floating a new requirement, it’s crucial to identify existing, proven technologies, such as those in Ukraine or its joint European efforts. Explore licensing or direct purchasing of these platforms. Often, the U.S. overlooks this step, claiming it’s essential for a domestic industrial base. However, the cost-benefit trade-off could be significant, potentially endangering lives.
In any requirement, consumable weapons should be designed to cost the minimum necessary to accomplish the task, with a goal of achieving a cost less than the intended target. Speed of delivery and adaptability of the platform to changing threats must also be critical factors.
Currently, there’s no incentive for performers to save money or identify deficiencies in platforms. Approaches rely on artificial rates that must be expended by the next cycle. Innovation and technology change rapidly during an acquisition program, creating financial disincentives to finding cheaper, better solutions. Programs to reward performers who provide rapid, cost-effective, sustainable solutions could yield results.
• Josh “Bugsy” Segal is an adviser to senior leaders across the Department of Defense and the services. He is a former naval officer and senior policy official who frequently travels to Ukraine to study developments on the battlefield.
Please read our comment policy before commenting.