The threat of China’s growing navy

OPINION:

China will soon commission its third aircraft carrier, the Fujian. The first of its kind to be put into service in the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the Fujian’s three electromagnetic aircraft launch systems ensure that the carrier can employ the full range of China’s carrier-capable aircraft, including the airborne early warning control system KJ-600, the J-35 fifth-generation stealth and the fully loaded, fourth-generation J-15T fighter/attack aircraft.

It is too early to tell whether the PLA Navy intends to build manned or unmanned tanker aircraft.

Despite lacking the strategic operating range and full combat capabilities of its American counterparts, Fujian adds greatly to the PLA Navy’s naval power within and along the First Island Chain. It marks the latest step in Beijing’s naval challenge to American sea power. Attention must now shift to China’s reportedly more capable Type 004 aircraft carrier, which is expected to be launched within the next two years.

Little is known about the Type 004, but Chinese sources report that its full load displacement will exceed 100,000 tons and suggest its air wing may include up to 90 aircraft, some of which may be unmanned. Western defense analysts are divided over its propulsion system. Most believe it will have nuclear power. The evidence of that so far is sparse but credible. China completed a prototype 400- to 500-megawatt maritime nuclear reactor in November 2024, an expensive project that indicates a commitment to maritime nuclear power greater than that required for the PLA Navy’s largest submarines. However, training a crew cadre and developing standard operating procedures for shipboard operations is not a fast process. Additionally, the construction of the ship’s reactors will take up to 12 to 18 months, depending on the program’s priority and the availability of materials and personnel.

Also, nuclear plants differ in layout from conventional power plants. A 1.2-gigawatt conventional plant requires eight boilers, versus the two 500-megawatt or two to four 400-megawatt reactors of a nuclear power plant. Reactors are larger than boilers and require containment shielding and stronger foundations. That difference is apparent in any overhead imagery. The Type 004’s construction may be progressing more slowly than that of the previous carriers, and the program managers await completion of the reactors before starting the engineering plant’s fabrication. In any case, electrical generating capacity will be a major feature in the engineering plant because of the demands of the electromagnetic aircraft launch systems and the PLA Navy’s interest in laser-based close-in-weapons systems.

The PLA Navy’s current operational focus is on dominating the “near seas” — that is, the waters within or along the First Island Chain. That does not require nuclear-powered warships, particularly given the expected support of the PLA’s air and rocket forces. However, nuclear-powered carriers and task forces are essential for operations into the “Far Seas” — the waters beyond the First and Second island chains. The aircraft carrier program is but one component of China’s air-sea challenge to the U.S. China’s submarine and amphibious forces are also on the rise. For example, the electromagnetic aircraft launch systems-equipped Type 076 landing helicopter assault’s sea trials are just weeks away.

The Type 004’s construction provides insights into the direction and pace of the PLA’s growing naval challenge. It is clear that Beijing intends to build nuclear-powered catapult-assisted takeoff, barrier arrested recovery carriers to rival those of the United States. The only open question is whether it will be the Type 004, expected to enter service by 2030, or multiple Type 005s, expected to enter service in the 2030s. The Chinese Communist Party has stated the goal of possessing a global navy by 2049, and nuclear-powered carriers and possibly other warships will play key roles in achieving that goal.

• Carl O. Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy captain who served 25 years as director of operations at what was then the U.S. Pacific Command’s Joint Intelligence Center.