Trump’s peace plan up against Russia’s shaky history with deals

President Trump’s Ukraine-Russia peace plan will have one of two outcomes if it’s ultimately signed by the two warring parties.

It could be viewed by history as a landmark agreement that quieted years of fighting in Ukraine and halted Russian President Vladimir Putin’s military reach into Eastern Europe.

Or it could join the Budapest Memorandum, Minsk agreements, Helsinki Accords and other pacts that Russia signed but eventually swept aside.

Many foreign policy analysts and defense insiders believe the second scenario is far likelier, given Russia’s half-century-long record of blatantly violating agreements it signed and, in some cases, helped craft. 

Even some of Mr. Trump’s key GOP allies in Congress have warned against trusting anything that comes from the mouth of a “liar” such as Mr. Putin.

That’s not to say Mr. Trump’s peace push is doomed to failure. Specialists say there is a path to long-term success, but it’s narrow and would require a slate of aggressive deterrence provisions — such as an agreement that the U.S. and Europe would come to Ukraine’s defense if Russia attacks again — that Washington seems unwilling to embrace.

Without such conditions, history suggests that any deals signed by Russia won’t hold up.

“It’s not just Minsk or the Helsinki Accords. There have been so many things that have been blown to pieces. No matter which one you want to select, the track record for Putin and Russia is not good,” said Jim Townsend, former deputy assistant secretary of defense for European and NATO policy during the Obama administration.

“Putin himself has shown he doesn’t let agreements stop him,” he said in an interview.

“The Helsinki Accords, he invaded Georgia [in 2008]. Budapest Memorandum, he invades Ukraine. He signed an agreement guaranteeing its security,” said Mr. Townsend, now a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. “Going into negotiations with this guy as a professional diplomat, you know he has a track record of breaking agreements, so you have to fortify, hedge and verify all the time.”

Under the 1994 Budapest Memorandum, Ukraine agreed to give up its stockpile of Soviet-era nuclear weapons in exchange for promises that Russia would respect its sovereignty and its existing borders.

In 1975, the Soviet Union signed the Helsinki Accords, a Cold War-era deal in which signatories agreed to respect borders across Europe and not use military force against other nations.

In 2003, Russia signed the Treaty on the Russia-Ukraine State Border, which further codified the respective boundaries between the two countries.

In 2014 and 2015, after its invasion of Ukraine’s Crimean peninsula, Russia signed the Minsk agreements, meant to de-escalate the conflict in Ukraine’s Donbas region and provide for the withdrawal of heavy weapons and other military equipment from the region.

While Russia has its own interpretation of events, all of those agreements were seemingly violated by the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. 

’Trust but verify’ for the 21st century

It’s no surprise, then, that the U.S. and Ukraine harbor serious doubts about Russia’s true intentions, regardless of whatever documents it signs. The mantra of “trust but verify” dates back to the Reagan era and for decades has been a central plank of the approach of administrations of both parties when dealing with Russia. 

Mr. Trump’s key negotiators — Secretary of State Marco Rubio and White House special envoy Steve Witkoff — have said as much publicly, stressing repeatedly that the Trump administration will not simply take Moscow’s word for anything.

After intense talks with the Ukrainians in Geneva recently, Mr. Rubio reiterated that the U.S. understands any deal must give assurances to Kyiv that it won’t be invaded again.

“Clearly, I think we all recognize that part of getting a final end to this war will require for Ukraine to feel as if it is safe and it is never going to be invaded or attacked again,” the secretary said. “So, that’s clearly something that has to be discussed.”

The U.S. and Ukrainian delegations have agreed to the “core terms” of Mr. Trump’s proposal, though it’s not clear how significantly that proposal was changed during the course of negotiations. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said he hopes to discuss the central tenet of the plan, possible territorial concessions or swaps with Russia, in person with Mr. Trump in the coming days.

The initial draft called for Ukraine to cede some land in the Donbas region to Russia, accept limits on the size of its military, agree to not join NATO and other conditions.

In return, Ukraine would receive security guarantees from the U.S. and European nations, but those guarantees were initially vague, and it’s not clear whether any concrete mechanisms are in the proposal to prevent Russia from attacking Ukraine in the future.

That’s a problem, specialists and key lawmakers say, because there is no reason at this point to take the Kremlin’s word for anything, whether that relates to promises about future military action by Russia or pledges to limit certain elements of its own armed forces or its weapons arsenal.

“Any assurances provided to Putin should not reward his malign behavior or undermine the security of the United States or allies. In particular, any suggestion that we can pursue arms control with a serial liar and killer like Putin should be treated with great skepticism,” Sen. Roger Wicker, Mississippi Republican and chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, said in a statement after the initial draft of Mr. Trump’s 28-point peace plan was leaked to the media.

It’s difficult to see a pathway to a deal that all parties agree to and provides concrete provisions to ensure Russia won’t invade Ukraine again. But analysts say there are several ideals that the U.S. should pursue to prevent history from repeating itself.

“It’s all about deterrence,” said Mr. Townsend, the former Pentagon official. “That means making sure that in Ukraine, their military is very good and very well-trained. They have to have their own defense industry that can keep them supplied with everything they need. They’re going to have defensive fortifications. They’re going to have to be like Israel.”

He added, “What would be great is to have a … security guarantee,” meaning European and  U.S. troops near Ukraine, perhaps in Poland, along with Western military equipment in Ukraine itself. “They would be a tripwire. Russia would know the West is very serious about protecting Ukraine, and they should show that seriousness by having prepositioned equipment … and interoperability with the Ukrainian forces. That would deter Russia.”