- Thursday, May 8, 2025

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President Trump’s recent statement that the U.S. will accept nothing less than “total dismantlement” of Iran’s nuclear program, along with the administration’s threat of sanctions against anyone who buys Iranian oil and its warning that Iran will “pay the consequences” for supporting the Yemen-based Houthis, are welcome signals that when the fourth round of nuclear talks begins, the U.S. will be in a position to reverse the mistakes of the Iran negotiations of 2015.

Washington’s hard-line stance will give it much more leverage in the nuclear talks, which are reportedly resuming in Oman this weekend, than it had a decade ago. That’s particularly important because Iran today is much more dangerous than it was in 2015, when I was a member of the Israeli delegation that discussed with President Obama’s team what demands to make in its talks with Tehran.

Iran has used the intervening years to significantly advance its military nuclear program. It has accumulated enough highly enriched uranium to produce fissile material for about 10 nuclear bombs within a short time. It possesses missiles that can carry a nuclear warhead and reach any target in the Middle East. At the same time, Iran is more vulnerable now that its economy has been hobbled and its air defenses suffered a severe blow in Israel’s counterattack in October.



Ten years ago, the U.S. delegation expressed appreciation for our ideas on how to keep Iran in check, but it largely did not enact them and ended up acceding to Iran’s demands. The delegation also gave us insight into its thinking. It expected that lifting sanctions would improve the Iranian economy so much that the regime would abandon its malign ambitions and become a contributing member of the family of nations.

My response to this pipe dream was bitter laughter because it failed to grasp that the Iranian regime is on a mission to spread its fundamentalist version of Shiite Islam all over the world. Signing an accord with the “Great Satan” and its allies wasn’t going to alter the foundational principles of the Islamic Revolution.

In 2015, the U.S. and Israel had competing theories about how Iran might behave under a deal. Ten years on, though, we have hard-won evidence that dealmaking has failed to constrain the Islamic republic. The deal gave Iran ample resources to arm itself and its terrorist proxies, leading to the 2019 attack on the world’s largest oil facility, in Saudi Arabia, and eventually to Hamas’ barbaric attack on Israel on Oct. 7, 2023, which set off the Israel-Hamas war and many subsequent Iranian, Hezbollah and Houthi attacks.

In light of these incontrovertible indications of the danger Iran poses to the world, the U.S. must halt Iran’s nuclear development and its expression of the underlying ideology that drives it. Washington must insist that Iran stop arming its allies, denying the Holocaust and calling for Israel’s destruction, given how dangerous such hate can be.

Most of all, the U.S. must revisit the core assumptions underlying its previous negotiations with Iran. Here’s what that could look like:

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• Reject Iran’s starting position.

The Iranian team is demanding the right to enrich uranium. Conceding this argument would allow Iran to frame the talks as a place to haggle over quantities. That’s a fundamental mistake with disastrous consequences because it gives Iran cover to develop centrifuges for enrichment, amass enriched uranium and ultimately shorten its path to weapons-grade fissile material. Secretary of State Marco Rubio is right to insist that Iran will have to stop enriching uranium.

• Make the agreement open-ended.

Another Iranian demand to which Washington too readily capitulated in 2015 was that time limits be placed on the nuclear program restrictions. This means that even if Iran adheres to every word of the deal, it will still be able to develop nuclear capabilities. All it needs to do is wait. That is a faulty principle that fails to reflect Iran’s mission to spread radicalism and instability in the name of Islam.

• It’s not just the centrifuges.

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Much of the talks revolve around Iran’s development of centrifuges, but that is only one part of the nuclear development process. Other components include mining uranium and converting uranium ore into yellowcake and yellowcake into uranium hexafluoride. Facilities involved in any part of the nuclear development process must all be dismantled or at least subject to restrictions imposed by a new nuclear deal, and Iran must not be allowed to develop or stockpile missiles capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

• Identify, inspect, eliminate.

Dismantling the Iranian nuclear program requires Iran to come clean on past nuclear activities, including four sites that Iran did not declare but were revealed in the nuclear archive brought to Israel in 2018. Unlimited inspections must be an ongoing part of identifying possible nuclear sites and verifying that the nuclear program has been dismantled. As part of this process, centrifuges must be eliminated, not just disassembled.

• Be ready for the next steps.

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If Iran is willing to relinquish any claim to nuclear enrichment, agree to an open-ended deal, dismantle its military nuclear program, disclose all nuclear activities, grant inspectors unrestricted access and refrain from arming its proxies, then the U.S. and Europe must be ready to verify that Iran has fully dismantled its weapons infrastructure and is no longer pursuing nuclear capabilities or malign activities.

As the world awaits the next step in the face-off with Iran, the U.S. must continue wielding the big stick of a credible military threat and undo past negotiating errors in light of today’s global realities. At the same time, Europe must be willing to trigger a viable “snapback” of all international sanctions on Iran. The U.S. and Europe must be fully prepared to carry through on these threats if Iran fails to agree to U.S. requirements that would reverse the mistakes of 2015 and deprive Iran of the capability to produce nuclear weapons once and for all.

•Yossi Kuperwasser, a retired Israeli brigadier general and former member of Israel’s Iran nuclear negotiating team, leads the Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security. He is a former head of the research division of the Israel Defense Forces’ military intelligence directorate and director-general of the Israeli Ministry of Strategic Affairs.

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