Overwhelmed by China, Manila looks for deal in flashpoint South China Sea

SEOUL, South Korea — Hounded, harassed and bullied by China in the South China Sea, Filipino leaders are scrambling to cut a deal with Beijing in hopes of avoiding a military showdown over contested islands, reefs and fishing spots off the western coast of the Philippines.

China’s mounting pressure campaign on another key American ally in the region ups the stakes this weekend for Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. Mr. Hegseth is due in Singapore to attend the Shangri-La Dialogue, Southeast Asia’s high-profile annual defense conference, which starts Friday.

Mr. Hegseth is expected to again make the case for U.S. allies to stick with the Trump administration, despite tariffs and growing concerns about America’s willingness — or even ability — to counter China.

In Manila, worried politicians are looking for a deal as the Chinese military ramps up its harassment in the South China Sea.

“We underscore the urgent need to accelerate the adoption of a legally binding code of conduct in the South China Sea,” Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. told the 46th Association of Southeast Asian Nations Summit in Malaysia this week. “This is to safeguard maritime rights, promote stability and prevent miscalculations at sea.”

Concerns are that a Philippines-China incident could escalate into a shootout, dragging in America.

On May 21, a Chinese Coast Guard vessel, roughly twice the size of its target, bore down on a Philippines Fisheries Department vessel, rammed it amidships, then hosed it down with water cannon, point-blank.

Jay Tarriela, spokesperson for the Philippines Coast Guard, condemned “the hostile actions by the Chinese Coast Guard” in a tweet on X, accompanied by footage.

The drama occurred off Pag-Asa Island, or Sandy Cay, the only Philippine community in the Spratly Islands, 276 miles west of the Philippine island of Palawan — where U.S. Marines were exercising this month. The island is 646 miles southeast of China’s nearest landmass, Hainan Island.

On Wednesday, the Philippines returned fire symbolically, staging a public relations victory: Its Coast Guard escorted a convoy of civilians and journalists to a concert on an isle off Palawan.

Three Chinese Coast Guard vessels kept their distance. Chinese state media called the incident a “farce” and a “desperate attempt to grab attention.”

Beijing claims some 90% of the South China Sea, a vast space encompassing commercial shipping lanes, rich fishing grounds and underwater resources. South of China, it is enclosed by Southeast Asia nations east, west and south.

But while the sea’s myriad — and inherently valuable — maritime features are claimed by multiple nations, only two are actively confronting Beijing.

Vietnamese forces have clashed with China’s ships, but currently, most confrontations are off the Philippines.

On Thursday, a senior Philippine official said Mr. Marcos will keep Defense Secretary Gilberto Teodoro Jr., who is among the most vocal critics of China in Asia, especially its increasingly assertive actions in the South China Sea, as Mr. Marcos overhauls his cabinet. 

The two countries reached an agreement last year to address China’s concerns about a makeshift Philippine base — the grounded hulk of a World War II-era vessel, the Sierra Madre. But elsewhere, tensions constantly flare and fade over reefs, atolls and fishing grounds.

Next year, Manila assumes chairmanship of ASEAN — a regional economic, rather than security, group. Hopes of a China-ASEAN code of conduct — as referenced by Mr. Marcos — which has been under negotiation since 2002, look vain.

Per Hong Kong’s South China Morning Post, an anonymous poll about the chances of it being signed was taken among attendees of the inaugural ASEAN Maritime Security 2025 Forum in Manila, from May 20-23.

One attendee believed it would be inked within three years, 18 assumed a decade and 28 assumed never.

“China’s current focus is to isolate the Philippines as far as possible within ASEAN, since Manila has publicly defied Beijing’s attempts to establish dominance and has revived its military alliance with the U.S.,” wrote the Australian Strategic Policy Institute in a May 20 report. “From Beijing’s perspective, ASEAN’s collective trajectory might be summarized as ‘losing without fighting.’”

Subsequently, Philippine Secretary for Foreign Affairs Enrique Manalo said, per Reuters, that Manila is open to “anything within the scope of diplomatic means or peaceful means or cooperation” to compromise with Beijing.

So far, Manila’s pleas have drawn little interest from Beijing — and options for the Philippines seem to be deteriorating daily.

ASEAN is toothless. Legal means have failed: Manila won a 2016 international arbitration on maritime territorial issues that was slammed, then ignored, by Beijing. Renewed security cooperation between Manila and Washington has not halted Chinese encroachment.

In 2023, the two allies upgraded their Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement to rotate more U.S. troops through the Philippines. Under it, GIs have deployed to locations including Palawan and northern Luzon.

Palawan faces Chinese encroachment in the west. Luzon lies south of the Bashi Channel, the naval choke point between the Philippines and Taiwan.

GIs in the Philippines have deployed “Typhon” rocket systems capable of striking coastal China, as well as NMESIS anti-shipping missiles that could deny the Bashi Channel to Chinese warships.

These big-war assets may reassure Taiwan, but they are not halting China’s gray-zone maneuvers off the Philippines.

Beijing’s expansion of maritime terrain follows a well-practiced model, used to inch forces not only toward the Philippines, but also toward Vietnam, Taiwan, and — with less success — Japan’s Senkaku Islands, known as the Diaoyus by China.

The strategy is spearheaded by “blue hulls” — maritime militias, weaponized elements of China’s huge fishing fleet — backed by “white hulls” — large and intimidating Coast Guard vessels. “Gray hulls” — warships — are usually kept at a distance, on overwatch.

Maritime militias outnumber Philippine fishing boats and even form floating area-denial cordons. Coast Guard vessels ram, hose and release motorboats filled with boarding parties.

Backing those mobile assets are 27 air-sea outposts China has terraformed on reefs and islets across the South China Sea: sensor bases, missile bases, warship docks, even jet fighter runways.

Manila cannot compete against Beijing in a single metric. Washington failed to prevent the construction of China’s South China Sea bases and is likewise poorly postured.

“The U.S. Navy is overstretched,” said Alex Neill, a Singapore-based security expert with Pacific Forum. “I don’t think the U.S. Coast Guard has the remit to operate in the South China Sea and the U.S. does not have a maritime militia: that is distinct to China.”

Regional allies are joining the effort, through training and equipment transfer, to upgrade Manila’s capabilities.

“Japan and Australia and the U.S. are trying to develop the Philippines’ capability but the challenge they are facing is that the capability gap is so large, it is hard to see how to fill it quickly and effectively,” said Garren Mulloy, a professor of international relations at Japan’s Daito Bunka University.

The Pentagon, having seen its high-tech, high-lethality forces humiliated in Afghanistan by low-tech, local forces, has no apparent desire to engage in seaborne guerilla scuffles in the IndoPacific.

Doubly so given Mr. Hegseth’s prioritization of lethality — the opposite of China’s inch-by-inch, sub kinetic approach.