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OPINION:
President Trump’s efforts to secure a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine are admirable. Equally important, however, are Ukraine’s security assurances.
During six-party negotiations with North Korea and before the signing of the September 2005 joint statement committing North Korea to “verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner,” North Korea’s lead negotiator, Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs Kim Kye-gwan, insisted that any agreement include “security assurances” to North Korea. Those security assurances were provided: “The United States … has no intentions to attack or invade North Korea with nuclear or conventional weapons, and North Korea and the U.S. undertook to respect each other’s sovereignty, exist peacefully together, and take steps to normalize their relations subject to their respective bilateral policies.”
The five countries negotiating with North Korea (China, South Korea, Japan, Russia and the U.S.) viewed North Korea’s insistence on security assurances as reasonable. Indeed, North Korean negotiators in private discussions with U.S. counterparts said security assurances were a piece that any future administration could discard. At the same time, denuclearization was the dismantlement of nuclear warheads and missiles for which North Korea paid millions of dollars to acquire. Despite this reality, North Korea was willing to move forward with a denuclearization commitment and hoped to normalize relations with the U.S.
As the Russian invasion of Ukraine enters its fourth year, with more than 700,000 casualties on both sides, it’s time to end this bloody war. It’s also time to provide Ukraine with meaningful security assurances to protect its independence and sovereignty.
This is especially important given Russia’s violation of the security commitments to Ukraine from the U.S., Russia and Britain in the Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances of Dec. 5, 1994.
These assurances protected Ukraine against the threat or use of force against its territory or political independence, respecting its sovereignty and existing borders. In exchange, Ukraine, the third-largest nuclear weapons state, dismantled or provided Russia with more than 1,900 nuclear warheads, intercontinental ballistic missiles and long-range bombers. Indeed, this was complete and verifiable denuclearization.
In March 2014, Russia invaded Ukraine and declared the annexation of Crimea. The U.S., Britain and Ukraine called the annexation a blatant violation of the security assurances in the 1994 Budapest Memorandum. To date, Russia occupies Crimea with little likelihood that it will ever be returned to Ukraine.
Hopefully, Mr. Trump will secure a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine. Chinese President Xi Jinping should support this effort to end the war. Although China is receiving a discounted price for the oil and gas it is buying from Russia, China’s support to Russia — with dual-use technology, machine tools and microelectronics — permits Russia to continue its war of aggression in Ukraine. China’s international credibility with the European Union, the Global South and others has been measurably affected by China’s “no limits” support for Russia.
The symbolism of North Korea providing troops to Russia, in addition to artillery shells and ballistic missiles, will finally end with a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine. In turn, this could get the focus back on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs and the importance of resuming negotiations with North Korea to eventually secure the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula.
Working closely with our NATO allies, a peaceful resolution to the war in Ukraine is achievable, especially with Mr. Trump’s focus on ending this war peacefully and ensuring we don’t stumble into World War III.
• Joseph R. DeTrani is a former director of East Asia operations at the CIA, a former special envoy for six-party talks with North Korea (2003-2006), a former director of the National Counterproliferation Center and associate director of national intelligence. He has written “The North Korean Threat: Intelligence and Diplomacy,” recently published by the National Institute for Public Policy. The views are the author’s, not the views of any government agency or department.
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