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OPINION:
The technologies of warfare move at their own pace. Sometimes they walk, and sometimes, like now, they sprint.
Hypersonic missiles, artificial intelligence, drones and electronic jamming are developing exceedingly fast.
The United States is falling behind rapidly for several reasons. One is the absurdly complex acquisition system that takes decades to buy things. Another is that, as Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth said in his confirmation hearing, the Pentagon is too insular and tries to block new technologies.
Since about 1950, the United States has had an enormous advantage in warfighting technology. Our commanders have come to expect that we can establish air supremacy almost instantly, meaning nothing can move in the sky, on the sea or on the ground without our permission. Yet air supremacy isn’t an American birthright; it has to be won every time.
The first contract for the F-35, then called the Joint Strike Fighter, was signed in 2001. It wasn’t until 2024 that the aircraft went into full-rate production. The Air Force acknowledged in 2023 that the F-35’s mission capability rate had shrunk to 52%. That means that if a commander orders 20 F-35s to fly a given mission, only 10 can. That’s not just pathetic; it’s crippling to our ability to fight.
The USS Gerald Ford, our newest aircraft carrier, took more than a dozen years to design and build. At more than 1,000 feet long, it’s a big picture on enemies’ satellites and radars. The Chinese are producing hypersonic carrier-killer missiles from which our ships can’t hide. Most predictions I’ve seen if we defend Taiwan say we would lose at least two carriers and about 12,000 sailors and 150 aircraft with them.
Building our spy satellites probably takes less time because fewer hands are in the pie.
Bear with me, dear reader. We have to discuss the dullest subject on this side of the U.S. tax code: the federal acquisition system.
The system is premised on competition, which usually drives down prices. Bids are invited for the small stuff, and quick competition leads to purchasing off-the-shelf items such as furniture and office equipment. For our primary weapon systems, a request for proposals results in elaborate, multi-thousand-page proposals that kick off 10- or 20-year acquisitions.
In 1949, the Hoover Commission recommended a centralized acquisition agency for all the armed forces. That recommendation died on the vine. The 1982 Packard Commission made the same recommendation and recommended that Congress pass two-year authorizations and appropriations instead of the one-year process it did and still does. Politics prevented that from happening.
One Hoover-Packard recommendation led to the creation of a “procurement czar” for the Defense Department, the “undersecretary for acquisition.” As the F-35 proved, that was ineffective.
An overhaul of the acquisition system is long overdue. We must find ways to deliver weapon systems much faster and commit the process to providing what the warfighter needs. If that doesn’t happen, our technological advantage in warfighting will disappear quickly.
The first thing to do is to throw out the 2,400-page Federal Acquisition Regulation along with the Pentagon supplement. Its mandates require so many time-wasting studies, audits and reviews that they have become unfixable.
Second, the “acquisition workforce” needs to be thinned out. If DOGE wants a Pentagon target, it’s a mighty fat one.
Third, why not incentivize the industry to take less time to produce what the warfighter needs?
Most contracts for ships, planes, missiles and satellites are “cost plus,” i.e., the government pays the contractor its cost of building a system and adds incentive payments. Those payments should be reoriented to provide incentives for speed and mission capability, balanced by disincentives, or penalties, for delays. With the right incentives, contractors can work miracles.
I was a deputy undersecretary of defense for acquisition from 1990 to 1991. One agency that came under our supervision was DARPA, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
On the first day of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, several of our tanks and vehicles were hit by friendly fire during sandstorms, causing several casualties. Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, the commander of the war, sent a message to Defense Secretary Dick Cheney asking for help.
Twenty-four hours later, the director of DARPA stopped by on his way to Mr. Cheney’s office to show me something. It was a coffee-can-shaped object that emitted a powerful infrared signal warning off our aircraft. Mr. Cheney immediately ordered it into production. It saved many lives.
The infrared beacon solved a simple problem. Aircraft, ships and missiles are vastly more complex, but they must be fielded far more quickly. Our forces deserve the best and most advanced weapon systems in time to meet their battlefield requirements. Time is the limiting factor, and industry must be incentivized to meet the warfighters’ needs.
• Jed Babbin is a national security and foreign affairs columnist for The Washington Times and contributing editor for The American Spectator.
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