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OPINION:
In 2021, at the eighth Congress of the Workers’ Party, Kim Jong-un announced to the world that North Korea would have:
- An intercontinental ballistic missile.
- Submarines capable of launching ballistic missiles.
- A super large hydrogen bomb and hypersonic missiles, all capable of destroying targets within a range of 9,320 miles.
Mr. Kim also announced that North Korea was in the final stages of developing a nuclear submarine and military reconnaissance satellites.
Since then, North Korea successfully launched the Hwasong-19, a solid-fueled ICBM with a range of 9,320 miles, multiple submarine-launched ballistic missiles and launches of intermediate-range hypersonic missiles. In November 2023, North Korea successfully launched a reconnaissance satellite.
A few weeks ago, North Korea released photos of Mr. Kim inspecting a nuclear-powered strategic guided missile submarine under construction. Indeed, a nuclear-powered submarine will give North Korea the capability of reaching targets in South Korea, Japan, Guam and eventually the U.S. It was this latest development that got the international community’s attention, with South Korea announcing that North Korea’s nuclear-powered submarines could launch as many as 10 ballistic missiles.
North Korea’s new allied relationship with Russia and their mutual defense treaty obviously contributed to its recent progress with reconnaissance satellites and nuclear-powered submarines. Russia is likely aiding North Korea’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs, including equipping missiles with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles.
In return for this military assistance and for the food and energy Russia is providing, North Korea is giving Russia more than 10,000 well-trained troops for its war with Ukraine and thousands of containers of short-range ballistic missiles, anti-air and anti-tank missiles, rockets and rocket launchers. All are apparently compatible with Russian weapons systems, given that North Korea previously received much of its weaponry from the Soviet Union in the 1970s and 1980s before the 1991 collapse of the Soviet empire.
Much of North Korea’s military buildup with Russian assistance must be concerning to China.
President Xi Jinping is probably receiving updates from Moscow and Pyongyang about their strengthened alliance, but he is likely unaware of the details and extent of this close relationship. Indeed, the relationship emboldens Mr. Kim and could encourage him to be even more provocative with South Korea. This could escalate into conflict between the two Koreas. Any conflict on the Korean Peninsula would concern China, knowing the U.S. and its allies would also be involved. China is focusing on taking Taiwan and expanding its influence in the South China Sea, not contending with conflict on the Korean Peninsula.
North Korea’s allied relationship with Russia should concern all nations, especially those in Northeast Asia. It should also encourage the U.S. to double down on its mutual defense commitments to South Korea and Japan and ensure a continued U.S. military presence in both countries. Given China’s focus on unification with Taiwan and Mr. Xi’s apparent objective of achieving this mission, either peacefully or through kinetic means, during his presidency, indicates that a continued U.S. military presence in the region, which could be used to counter a Chinese military action on Taiwan, is not in China’s interest.
Strong sentiment in South Korea is that it needs its own nuclear deterrent. The dominant view is that relying on the U.S. nuclear umbrella is problematic, especially now, given North Korea’s military buildup and alliance with Russia.
It is not only South Korea that may consider nuclear options; Japan also perceives a potential threat from North Korea. This could prompt Japan to pursue its own nuclear deterrent.
For 25 years, North Korea negotiated with the U.S., hoping to have a normal relationship. The thinking was that such a relationship would give North Korea the international legitimacy to attract economic development assistance and access to global financial institutions.
In 2024, Mr. Kim pivoted to Russia and gave up on the U.S. Indeed, Mr. Kim should be pleased with accomplishing a peace and friendship treaty with China and a mutual defense treaty with Russia. As an active member of the axis of authoritarian states with China, Russia and Iran, North Korea now, in a perverse way, has the international legitimacy it has pursued for decades as a nuclear weapons state.
These unfortunate developments are not in the interest of the U.S. and its allies and partners.
• Joseph R. DeTrani is a former director of East Asia operations at the CIA, a former special envoy for six-party talks with North Korea (2003-2006), a former director of the National Counterproliferation Center and associate director of national intelligence. He wrote “The North Korean Threat: Intelligence and Diplomacy,” recently published by the National Institute for Public Policy. The views are the author’s, not the views of any government agency or department.
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