Erdogan’s moment: Turkish leader has become indispensable in Trump’s Middle East

ISTANBUL — President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, emboldened by the Trump administration’s embrace of a more muscular Turkey, is racing to capitalize on the opening by settling scores, making deals and putting his country center stage in the Middle East.

The Turkish leader’s actions, including reopening ties with Damascus and raising interest rates, reflect a strategy to maximize his leverage during President Trump’s four-year second term.

Analysts say this has created the most permissive international environment Mr. Erdogan has experienced in years, even with economic pressures at home.

Municipal elections last year marked the worst setback for Mr. Erdogan’s party in two decades. Economic fatigue continues to weigh on voters.

Ihsan Aktas, chairman of the pro-Erdogan polling firm GENAR, wrote in Daily Sabah that the Erdogan-Trump alignment is a “turning point.” He said Mr. Trump has abruptly replaced Washington’s cautious diplomacy with a more Ankara-focused foreign policy.

Mr. Aktas said Mr. Erdogan is now projecting Turkish influence from the Red Sea to the Caucasus. He characterized Ankara not as an aspiring hegemony but as a practical partner in managing conflicts.

“This coordination unsettles adversaries like Iran and Greece while providing reassurance to countries worried about instability in Israel and fragmentation in Europe,” he said.

Not all analysts say Mr. Erdogan’s position is assured.

“It is sustainable,” Suat Kınıklıoglu, a former member of the Turkish parliament and commentator, told The Washington Times. “But the West has largely accepted that Turkey is likely to be governed in an authoritarian way.

“Ankara remains vital to European security in part because of the millions of refugees it hosts,” he said, “and even more so now due to its expanding defense sector and role in Ukraine.”

Under the Biden administration, Ankara was sidelined. F-35 negotiations collapsed, U.S. relations with the anti-Turkey Kurdish militias deepened, and Mr. Erdogan’s mediation efforts were dismissed.

Mr. Trump’s second term, however, has opened doors.

“Ankara sees this as a window of opportunity, not a permanent realignment,” Omer Ozkizilcik, a researcher at the Atlantic Council, told The Times. “There’s now a realistic chance the [the Kurdish Workers’ Party] could be weakened, not just rhetorically but on the ground.”

Mr. Trump named longtime associate Tom Barrack as ambassador to Turkey and special envoy to Syria. Mr. Barrack quickly reopened the U.S. ambassador’s residence in Damascus and authorized Caesar Act waivers, allowing American and allied firms to engage in Syrian reconstruction.

At a summit last month in Istanbul, Mr. Erdogan joined Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa and Mr. Barrack for talks on borders, energy and Syria’s economic reintegration. Mr. Erdogan praised the U.S. shift as “bold and overdue.”

Markets reacted. Turkey’s central bank raised interest rates by 500 basis points on May 23, pushing the benchmark to 55%, a dramatic departure from Mr. Erdogan’s earlier resistance to rate hikes.

The Istanbul stock exchange recorded modest gains, and the lira stabilized. The annual inflation rate remains high at 35.4% but has fallen from its peak of 75%. The unemployment rate sits at 8.6%. Although challenges persist, investors view Ankara’s return to conventional monetary policy as a signal of greater predictability.

Adding to Ankara’s strategic profile, Mr. Erdogan announced Wednesday that Turkey had signed its first export deal for the locally built Kaan fighter jet, with 48 units to be delivered to Indonesia. The agreement marks a milestone in Turkey’s push to become a defense exporter and reinforces Mr. Erdogan’s bid for global relevance.

Turkey is also building its role as a regional energy hub.

Once seen as dependent on Israeli cooperation for energy access, Ankara has diversified. It is now tapping Black Sea gas fields, expanding pipeline links with Azerbaijan, and extending its energy reach into Central Asia and northern Iraq. The Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline connects Turkey with Europe through a southern corridor.

Still, competition lingers.

“They view the Israel-Greece-Cyprus axis as a threat,” said Emmanuel Navon of Tel Aviv University. “Erdogan was deeply opposed to the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He even blamed Israel. Turkey is stronger now, but it hasn’t dismantled the Israeli-backed EastMed framework.”

The Eastern Mediterranean alliance, anchored by Israel, Greece and Egypt, includes historic rivals of Ankara. The bloc remains a counterweight to Mr. Erdogan’s ambitions despite Turkish efforts.

Turkish state companies are also expanding electricity infrastructure into northern Syria, presenting themselves as postwar stabilizers. With sanctions eased, Ankara has more room to maneuver economically and diplomatically.

Mr. Erdogan has also tried to assert a mediating role in the Ukraine conflict. In early June, Turkey hosted high-level talks between Ukrainian and Russian officials in Ankara. Though the negotiations yielded no breakthroughs, Turkish officials emphasized their neutral posture and the strategic importance of the Black Sea.

Analysts said the talks reinforced Mr. Erdogan’s bid to remain indispensable to both NATO and Moscow.

Diplomatic style has also shifted. President Biden’s ambassador to Turkey, Jeff Flake, clashed with Mr. Erdogan by meeting opposition leader Kemal Kılıcdaroglu.

Mr. Erdogan publicly declared his doors closed to Mr. Flake.

In contrast, Mr. Barrack is seen in Ankara as someone who shares Mr. Erdogan’s preference for personal deal-making.

Yet political analysts caution that foreign policy gains don’t always translate into domestic political strength. “Inflation and job market pressures still shape politics, especially among young voters,” Mr. Ozkizilcik said.

In the 2024 municipal elections, the opposition CHP retained control of Istanbul and Ankara and made gains elsewhere. In March, Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoglu, widely seen as Mr. Erdogan’s most credible challenger, was arrested on corruption and terrorism charges. The timing, one day after a Trump-Erdogan call, triggered public protests and drew criticism from civil society groups.

“I think Imamoglu’s arrest is a serious sign of weakness,” Mr. Kınıklıoglu said. “Erdogan seems to recognize that winning through elections is increasingly uncertain.

“There’s an irony,” he added, “given how Erdogan rose to national prominence after serving as Istanbul’s mayor and serving a brief prison term in 1999.

“He is vulnerable, as much of the public sees the charges against Imamoglu as politically motivated,” he told The Times.

Mr. Kılıçdaroglu resigned from CHP leadership in November 2023, months after losing the presidential race. His departure left the opposition without a clear successor, even as Mr. Erdogan intensified pressure on local leaders.

Mr. Erdogan continues to emphasize diplomacy to expand Turkey’s reach.

At a Pakistan-Turkey-Azerbaijan summit in the Lachin corridor, a strategic mountain pass between Armenia and Azerbaijan that has become a focal point of postwar regional integration, he declared, “We may be three different countries, but we are one nation,” reaffirming Ankara’s growing alignment with post-Soviet Muslim states.

Symbolism also has played a role.

At the European Political Community summit in Tirana, Mr. Erdogan turned a handshake with French President Emmanuel Macron, whose government has repeatedly clashed with Ankara over its support for Armenia and criticism of Turkey’s role in the South Caucasus, into an awkward power play. He gripped Mr. Macron’s finger for more than 10 seconds and refused to let go.

The viral exchange captured Mr. Erdogan’s comfort with confrontation and disregard for diplomatic choreography.

His posturing resonates with governments skeptical of Western leadership. With Mr. Trump advocating a reduced U.S. role in the region, Ankara is positioning itself as a preferred intermediary.

Still, Mr. Erdogan’s rhetoric remains divisive.

On Oct. 25, 2023, after a bloody week in the Gaza Strip, he told Parliament, “Hamas is not a terrorist organization; it is a liberation group, waging a battle to protect its lands and people.” The statement drew condemnation from the U.S. and Israel.

“Israel is pushing for deeper U.S. involvement,” Mr. Ozkizilcik told The Times. “Turkey wants Washington to scale back and let regional actors take responsibility.”

That divergence reflects Mr. Trump’s reciprocity diplomacy. “Trump doesn’t care about human rights or democracy; he cares about utility,” Mr. Navon told The Times. “Erdogan plays both sides. But Turkey is in NATO. You can’t ignore him.”

He said Mr. Trump has had “a free hand, especially in Syria, which worries Israel, but Israel’s strategic partnership with the U.S. runs deeper.”

“If betraying the Kurds suits his agenda, Trump will do it,” he said. “He doesn’t know who they are or care.”

He added that “Turkey has expanded its energy map, but it hasn’t dismantled the EastMed bloc.”

“Syria remains shattered. Trump easing sanctions may be an experiment to see if [the new president] can survive economically, and whether that could lay the groundwork for future normalization with Israel. It’s speculative but consistent with the administration’s deal-driven thinking.”

Mr. Navon added that “being a mediator is always risky. If Erdogan miscalculates in Ukraine or Syria, it could backfire.”