The nuclear-powered icebreaker imperative

OPINION:

The Arctic region has become critical to national security and is being hotly contested by several nations, including China. While China isn’t located anywhere near the Arctic, it has an insatiable appetite for resources — and the Arctic offers oil, gas, rare earth minerals and more.

Currently, the prime competitors for dominance in the region are the United States and Russia. But navigating the Arctic is not like cruising the Caribbean. Ice abounds in its frigid waters, and unfortunately for the United States, only icebreaker ships can safely navigate them.

Consider this potential scenario, which could occur within the next few years: Massive new Russian and Chinese nuclear-powered icebreakers power through 10-foot-thick ice in the Arctic Ocean while a much smaller American icebreaker is stuck in ice too dense for it to navigate. How embarrassing and ridiculous would that be? Yet that is exactly where we are headed unless some dramatic changes are made.

Given that the United States has the best military on Earth, one might think that America has a great Arctic fleet and that Russia has a few rusting tramp steamers. That guess is exactly backward. Russia has seven nuclear-powered icebreakers in operation and is building a massive new one. China also has a major program to deploy nuclear-powered icebreaker ships. The United States? We have no nuclear-powered icebreakers. While it is true that the Arctic is warming, icebreakers are still required to plow through very thick ice. Nuclear- powered icebreakers can break through thicker ice that conventionally powered icebreakers simply cannot traverse.

The United States has only two conventionally powered icebreakers in service (one of which, the aging Polar Star, was commissioned in the 1970s and is only kept afloat via the cannibalization of parts from other unserviceable icebreaker ships). By investing in our own nuclear-powered icebreaker fleet, the U.S. can begin to close this strategic gap, assert our sovereign interests and prevent potential adversaries from monopolizing critical passages and Arctic resources.

As evidenced by the U.S. Navy’s nuclear-powered carriers and submarines, nuclear propulsion offers unparalleled endurance and power and would allow icebreakers to operate year-round without the need for constant refueling, an essential capability in the remote and severe Arctic environment.

In addition to keeping commercial American shipping lanes open year-round in the Arctic, these vessels would enable rapid response to emergencies or emerging threats, support scientific research, be a visible symbol of commitment to Arctic engagement, strengthen alliances with other Arctic nations and signal resolve to adversaries.

While the U.S. is working to add new conventionally powered icebreaker ships — including contemplating the purchase of such ships from Finland — these ships are and will be inferior to Russia’s nuclear-powered ones. Since the U.S. is already working with Finland to develop conventional icebreaker ships, this relationship could be leveraged to allow the U.S. and Finland to develop an icebreaker ship platform into which the nuclear propulsion system could be inserted. And since reactors designed for submarines and aircraft carriers would not work due to weight, heat, size and other restrictions for an icebreaker ship, the propulsion system could be based on a compact reactor, fueled with a variant of highly enriched uranium.

This initiative would require presidential leadership. The U.S. Coast Guard operates the conventionally powered icebreaker ships remaining in service but has no nuclear capabilities, while the navy operates nuclear-powered aircraft carriers and submarines but has no icebreaker experience. The navy, coast guard and National Nuclear Security Administration should be directed to work together to determine the best way to proceed.

Russia and China have a dispositive advantage with regard to nuclear icebreakers in the Arctic. This puts the U.S. at a disadvantage in terms of securing access to Arctic shipping routes and access to the region’s critical mineral resources. To secure our nations’ strategic advantages in the Arctic, the U.S. should embark on an expedited nuclear-powered icebreaker deployment initiative.

• David S. Jonas is a partner at Fluet and a retired U.S. Marine Corps lieutenant colonel who served as nuclear nonproliferation planner for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He teaches at Georgetown and George Washington University law schools.