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OPINION:
The Iran-Israel ceasefire, announced by President Trump in the wake of what he referred to as the 12-Day War, has held, and the skies above both nations are quiet, the occasional missile from Houthi-occupied Yemen notwithstanding. The Iranian regime remains in power, but according to the Trump administration, the Israeli government, and the International Atomic Energy Agency, its nuclear weapons program has been severely crippled, if not obliterated. Additionally, Iran’s ability to confront its regional neighbors militarily has been effectively denuded.
A perusal of social media in the United States before and during the conflict may have given the impression that President Trump had felt heat from isolationist influencers on social media platforms who railed against “regime change” in Iran. But Mr. Trump’s own words, both in office and earlier on the campaign trail, clearly stated that while Iran must never be allowed to possess a nuclear weapon, an overthrow wasn’t desirable. Other Republicans concurred, and even über-interventionist Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC) last month wasn’t pushing for American boots on the ground.
What Mr. Trump and his advisors have long appreciated, going back at least to the invasion and occupation of Iraq, was the need to understand the perspectives of both Israel and our Muslim majority allies in the region. Among the latter, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are three important players that brought issues to the table, which the administration considered.
Researcher Hussein Aboubakr Mansour wrote in a Moment Magazine article of Saudi Arabia’s view of a hobbled Iran, “Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman, convinced that this century belongs to him and determined not to miss his historical opportunity, will vigorously assert Saudi primacy in Arab and regional affairs.”
Riyadh-based public policy strategist Mohammed Alhamed indicated, “the most important thing for [Saudi Arabia] is to see Iran without nuclear enrichment. We won’t allow that to happen because if it happens on the first day the world on the second day will see we have it already.” However, he added that Saudis had “no desire to change the regime from the outside because who will come after the theocracy may be worse for the Arab world,” including a restoration of a nationalist monarchy.
Up north, Turkey and Iran have been regional rivals since the 15th century, but the two powers have overseen a mostly constant and stable border since 1639. As with Saudi Arabia, a downtrodden regime in Tehran presents an opportunity for Ankara to consolidate and expand further its already growing influence in Syria, Iraq, the Caspian, and Central Asia, all at Iran’s expense, and therefore it is not surprising that the Turkish government didn’t object to the American attack. However, the longstanding strategic equilibrium is unlikely to be cast aside anytime soon.
“While Iran’s nuclear ambitions pose direct security concerns for Turkey, the existing power structure provides regional stability through established balance-of-power dynamics,” opined Emir Gurbuz, Secretary-General of the Turkish Atlantic Council. He warned of external attempts to establish a new government in Iran, pointing out that “political instability could generate significant refugee flows that would further strain Turkey’s capacities, given its existing burden of over 3.5 million Syrian refugees,” a consequence of a devastating civil war that lasted nearly 14 years.
And further east, Azerbaijan is far smaller than Iran in both size and population, yet has successfully fended off acts of Iranian intimidation since regaining its independence during the crack-up of the Soviet Union. The country features a Shi’a majority population but boasts a secular society and pro-Western orientation. Baku has balanced an oft-adversarial relationship with its theocratic southern neighbor while enhancing ties with Jerusalem, most recently evidenced by its state-owned hydrocarbon company, SOCAR, purchasing a 10-percent stake in an Israeli gas field in the Mediterranean.
“Azerbaijan wants to stay away from the conflict,” explained a Baku-based think tank analyst who requested anonymity. “Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon is the dangerous development, but equally dangerous is the disintegration of Iran [resulting in] chaos, refugees and instability at Azerbaijan’s southern borders. The best endgame is stability in Iran without nuclear weapons and proxy forces.”
Former chargé d’affaires in Washington and independent business executive Jayhun Mollazade said Azerbaijan is apprehensive of the havoc a “wounded bear” may cause, particularly since close to one-third of the 92 million Iranians (hat tip to a certain isolationist influencer) are ethnic Azerbaijani. Any sizable refugee flow into a country of 10 million inhabitants would undoubtedly be destabilizing.
These fears have been addressed for now, thanks to a Trump administration taking full advantage of Israel’s smashing military successes and executing a brilliant operation of its own, while not getting out over its skis and alienating allies. Should regime change still happen, contra the isolationist influencers, it will not have been concocted and executed by Washington.
• Jason Epstein is president of Southfive Strategies LLC, an international public affairs consultancy (@Southfive).
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