OPINION:
The Houthis’ renewed attacks on civilian shipping demonstrate the fallacy of accepting any terrorist group or regime’s “promise” to end its attacks. Like their agreements to any ceasefire, such pledges represent a falsehood intended to buy time to rebuild, reconstitute and prepare for their next round of violence.
The Houthis’ small boat swarms are not new. Still, as revealed in the recent video that the terrorist group released showing its sinking of the Eternity C, a Liberia-flagged bulk carrier, it wants the world to believe it is still employing missiles, probably to deter intervention by Western naval patrols. Yet their only new tactic is firing rocket-propelled grenades and planting explosives below ships’ waterlines. The new tactics promise a higher probability of sinking the target than the anti-ship missile strikes of the past. Instead of sinking three ships in 167 attacks, they have now sunk two out of two.
They will continue these attacks until they pay a high enough price and have a low enough probability of future success to quit.
Underwater detonations sink ships, something only missiles, torpedoes and the largest drones can achieve. Fortunately, small boats are easier to defeat than missiles, but most nations impose restrictive rules of engagement on their navies. These rules inhibit their navies’ ability to counter such attacks if the warships themselves are not attacked. Moreover, ending the small boat threat necessitates the destruction of their support structure, a resource-intensive campaign that few Western governments are willing to undertake.
The tactics displayed in the first video recently released by the Houthis, of their July 6 attack on the Magic Seas, another Liberia-flagged vessel, are reminiscent of those from Iranian media coverage of Tehran’s naval exercises of the 1990s. Those exercises included remotely piloted vehicles (rocket-propelled grenades, now called drones) plowing into ships, small attack boats swarming around them and swimmers attaching underwear explosives (called limpet mines) to enemy ships’ hulls.
The swarm tactics the Houthis employed earlier this month used the small-arms fire, rocket-propelled grenades and attached-limpet mines tactics of those Iranian naval exercises.
The second video the terrorists released, of their July 7 attack on the Eternity C, opened with file footage of ballistic and cruise missile launches, followed by a large explosion just forward of the ship’s pilot house. The intent: to suggest that the Houthis had integrated missile strikes into their drone and boat swarm tactics.
In reality, there was no ballistic missile hit. The video did not show a high-speed object hitting the ship just before the explosion. Missiles detonate inside the hull, sending a vast cloud of debris and smoke (but very little flame) skyward. Moreover, the ship was stationary at the time of the “missile strike,” indicating it had already been stopped and abandoned. Also, the damage displayed in the drone video reflected rocket-propelled grenade and drone hits, not those of a ballistic or cruise missile.
Nonetheless, the multiple holes at the waterline induced the flooding that ultimately sank the Eternity C. They also resorted to the tried-and-true terrorist practice of taking hostages, either to hold for ransom or use as human shields to deter retaliatory strikes.
The Houthis’ new reliance on swarm tactics has proved cost-effective so far. The boats, crews and weapons they use now are much cheaper than the missiles they employed in their previous 18-month campaign. If launched from shore, the boats and drones require a less visible and targetable infrastructure than missile systems, making them less vulnerable to retaliatory strikes.
Also, Iran may have ordered the Houthis not to employ any surviving missiles because of concerns about U.S. retaliation. Small boat attacks provide Iran with plausible deniability, and most Western politicians view any large-scale retaliatory strikes over them as excessive force. As a result, the Houthis will continue the attacks until they or Iran suffer negative consequences.
Regardless, the recent attacks achieved the Houthis’ intent and Iran’s goal of pressuring Israel and Western countries through shipping losses. They cost the ship’s owners, insurers and intended cargo customers millions of dollars in losses. More important, they have sent a message: They can inflict injury on any vessel passing through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. The only thing missing at this point is a demand for a “transit fee” (read: protection money).
The West’s first response should be the resumption of international naval patrols. NATO and European Union member navies can patrol the area from their leased access in nearby Djibouti, but they need to review their rules of engagement. If all they are authorized to do is accompany the merchant shipping, watch the attacks and then rescue survivors, their presence will not deter Houthi or other pirates’ attacks. Sinking the small boats inflicts a price on the attackers, and sanctions inflict a financial cost on their sponsors.
Precision air and missile strikes on the boats’ launch points will reduce the threat but will not end it. More important, targeting them will be difficult. The attackers’ launch points are unclear, difficult to locate and easily changed by the terrorists.
However, small boats rarely venture more than 10 nautical miles to reach their targets. This suggests that a mothership probably supported these latest attacks, and it can be located. Its seizure would reduce the attackers’ threat area and may provide intelligence on the organizations, planning and sponsorship behind the attacks.
The Houthis’ viability as a military force is dependent on Iran’s support, and Iran has made the destruction of Israel and the United States a national priority. Neither the Houthis nor Iran will give up on striking at the West or make any promise necessary to sustain that goal.
They interpret appeasement policies as weakness, any fund deliveries as tribute to the cause and military strikes as temporary setbacks, unless these strikes inflict personal losses upon the leadership. Like it or not, the Middle East’s terrorist problem will continue as long as regimes and sponsors are willing to keep the jihad going.
• Carl O. Schuster is a retired U.S. Navy captain with 25 years of active duty service.
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