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OPINION:
We have a different perspective on the capabilities and capacity of the Marine Corps than the one expressed in Bill Gertz’s recent article, “Marine commandant: Corps to focus on advanced Weapons and contested logistics in prep for war,” (Web, July 6).
The Marine Corps’s role in national security has always been as a global crisis response force, placed into law as an “expeditionary, combined arms force in readiness” that is “to be most ready when the nation is least ready.” Unfortunately, in response to the 2018 National Defense Strategy, the Marine Corps hastily reorganized and restructured from an effective and offensively oriented global expeditionary crisis force in readiness to a defensive, narrowly focused regional force.
This restructuring included an ill-advised move to fund the envisioned future capabilities by shedding a significant amount of combined arms warfighting capability, including armor, cannon artillery, bridging equipment, mine clearing equipment, aviation assets, logistics and — importantly — the “trigger pullers,” our individual Marines.
By pursuing a bankrupt philosophy of “divest to invest,” the Marines jettisoned combat capabilities needed to fight and win in the Indo-Pacific and in other theaters. In effect, the Marine Corps divested capability to invest in unproven future capabilities of questionable value to the Joint Force, or capabilities already in the other services in much greater numbers and lethality.
After six years of this force redesign, most of the expected new capabilities remain a work in progress and will almost certainly never be fielded in the quantities envisioned.
The sine qua non of this force design are small units of lightly armed and essentially unsupported Marines, isolated and widely dispersed on islands inside China’s “weapons engagement zone.” They are being armed with subsonic, short-range (115 nautical-mile) anti-ship missiles and active emitting radars.
These units will be easily detected, are incapable of defending themselves, lack the firepower to strike at distances that matter and have no means of logistical support. Their untenable positions and tasks eerily echo the Wake Island defenders of World War II — easily killed or captured at the onset of hostilities.
Other U.S. military service capabilities fielded today and meant to confront and defeat China in the Western Pacific are vastly superior to those envisioned by Force Design.
Since the onset of Force Design, the world has become even more dangerous and volatile. China is unquestionably the pacing threat, but it is not the only threat. State and non-state actors pose increasing challenges for our combatant commanders around the globe.
Our nation requires a Marine Corps that is organized, manned, trained, equipped and consistently afloat, ready to respond to contingencies globally. In an uncertain world, the United States needs a certain force — to gain decision space for our national leaders, to reassure allies and partners with whom we will invariably fight, and to set conditions for the Joint Force to fight and win.
That certain force is a Marine Air-Ground Logistics Task Force — ideally aboard amphibious ships and poised for any contingency across the spectrum of conflict. While senior leaders rightfully remain laser-focused on the threat of China in the Western Pacific, we must not lose sight of the fact that China’s interests and capabilities are global. It is in this broader context where asymmetric opportunities exist to confront China in every corner of the world.
And this is where the agility, flexibility and responsiveness of well-balanced Marine crisis response forces can best contribute to the success of the Joint Force — not marooned on small islands in the Western Pacific with duplicative (or, worse, questionable) capability.
The hasty decisions made by senior Marine Corps leaders in 2019 and solidified by the current senior leadership have proven to fall well short of the promised capability and have never been shown to be supportable. Meanwhile, China’s People’s Liberation Army and other potential adversaries around the world continue to enhance and increase their warfighting capabilities.
Unless the Marine Corps changes course, the Marines will continue to spend billions of dollars on capabilities that will neither deter nor defeat our nation’s enemies in the Indo-Pacific and other theaters. It’s time to reverse the crippling effects of the ongoing force redesign. Only then can the Marine Corps return to its unique role as the nation’s global expeditionary combined arms force in readiness.
• Gen. Charles (Chuck) Krulak is the former 31st commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps and Gen. Anthony (Tony) Zinni is a former commander, U.S. Central Command.
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