A bold approach for dealing with North Korea

OPINION:

The absence of diplomatic engagement with North Korea during the past four years has resulted in a more belligerent North Korea, now more aligned with Russia and China.

Those who disagree will say we tried, but we ignored North Korea, hoping that a policy of “containment and deterrence” would suffice. Well, it didn’t.

The Korean War Armistice of July 1953 succeeded in halting hostilities on the Korean Peninsula after three years of bloody conflict with significant casualties. The goal was an eventual peace treaty to end the war and bring peace to the peninsula and stability to the region. We are now further away from this goal than ever during the past 72 years. We are closer to conflict on the Korean Peninsula than at any other time since the signing of the armistice.

In the past four years, North Korea’s Kim Jong-un has declared South Korea and the U.S. as principal enemies in their constitution, rejecting peaceful reunification. He has increased the production of nuclear and hypersonic weapons and developed a significant ballistic missile capability, with short, intermediate and intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, including a mobile, solid-fuel ICBM (Hwasong-19) capable of targeting the entire U.S. Additionally, North Korea’s alignment with Russia includes a mutual defense treaty obligating each to defend the other in times of conflict.

There are more than 12,000 North Korean troops in the Kursk region of Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy just announced that an additional 25,000 North Korean troops will be sent to Russia to assist with its war in Ukraine. This is in addition to the munitions, missiles and artillery North Korea provides to Russia. In return, North Korea is likely receiving assistance with its satellite and missile programs and energy and agricultural assistance. A car bridge is being constructed across the Tumen River, boosting trade and tourism from Russia to North Korea. In short, North Korea’s allied relationship with Russia is deep and comprehensive.

Of course, North Korea continues to have China as its principal ally — an ally that supplies North Korea with crude oil, petroleum products and 90% of its trade, which are essential for sustaining a weak and vulnerable economy. China and Russia, by exercising their veto power, have prevented the United Nations Security Council from imposing sanctions on North Korea for its violations of Security Council resolutions that prohibit missile launches and nuclear tests.

We should not give up on North Korea. Indeed, we should stop ceding the playing field to Russia and China and constructively engage with it. President Trump has a personal relationship with Mr. Kim, permitting the U.S. to have at least a few senior-level meetings, not necessarily with Messrs. Trump and Kim, to determine whether there is value in continuing the dialogue.

North Korea will see value in having a meaningful dialogue with the U.S. if it realizes it is dealing with a Trump administration that is bold and flexible. Negotiating with North Korea using the same playbook we’ve used for the past 30 years won’t work. We saw this at the Hanoi summit. Mr. Kim is interested in a peace treaty to end the Korean War, security assurances, economic development assistance, the provision of light water reactors, the lifting of sanctions and a path to normal diplomatic relations with the U.S. He knows what we want: complete and verifiable denuclearization.

Indeed, we should state that this is our goal but pivot to the reality that North Korea may be willing to halt its nuclear weapons program but clearly will not agree to complete and verifiable denuclearization at this time. That does not mean, however, that we cease making this our long-term goal while seeking to get North Korea to halt nuclear tests, missile launches and the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons. This would be an action-for-action process, like our agreement with North Korea in the six-party talks.

Engaging boldly and flexibly now with North Korea would get the attention of Russia and China, both concerned that North Korea would prefer a normal relationship with the U.S. over an alliance with the North’s two neighbors.

• The author is the former special envoy for six-party talks with North Korea (2003-2006) and a former director of the National Counterproliferation Center. The views are the author’s and not those of any government agency or department.