France is no U.S. partner in the Middle East

OPINION:

The international conference at the United Nations, initiated by France and Saudi Arabia, concluded on July 29. It is noteworthy for little.

It repeated the tired formula of the “two-state solution,” for which there is no longer any majority support either in Israel or among the Palestinians. It envisions a democratic state, even though the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank has not held elections for years, and in Gaza, Hamas came to power through elections and might well win again. Repeating the same mantra of the two states without engaging with the political reality is a recipe for continued failure.

There is, however, an alternative agenda that could bring peace to the Middle Peace, the strategy of the Abraham Accords initiated during the first Trump administration. It includes building bridges between Arab states — the UAE, Bahrain, Sudan and Morocco — with Syria a potential candidate and Saudi Arabia on the horizon.

These political rapprochements are understood as gateways to economic cooperation and integration. For too long, the region has been held hostage to poor Palestinian leadership that has refused to accept offers for statehood, effectively holding out for its dream of eliminating Israel.

Yet the region cannot wait for the Palestinians to come to grips with the reality of the Jewish state. The Trump policy has a chance to break the deadlock and open a path to a prosperous Middle East.

The real point of the U.N. conference was nothing other than to derail this American foreign policy in the Middle East by undermining the Abraham Accords. This effort to block President Trump’s signature initiative belongs above all to French President Macron of France, who announced his intention to recognize Palestine at the U.N. General Assembly next month.

Mr. Trump has understood Mr. Macron’s game, calling him out publicly with the statement that what the French president said “doesn’t matter.” That is an objective description of Mr. Macron’s political standing — 19% approval rate at home — and France’s negligible geostrategic relevance. It’s a declining colonial power with a zombie economy.

It would be wise for Washington to consider taking steps to respond to Mr. Macon’s attempt to undermine the U.S. agenda. Even if his plan does not come to fruition, it will make matters more difficult for U.S. diplomacy. There are ways to make Paris pay a price for this obstreperousness. Mr. Macron is, of course, free to challenge Mr. Trump’s agenda, but he cannot be surprised if he faces payback.

The American response could take various shapes. The recently concluded tariff agreement between the U.S. and European Union still waits for many details to be worked out. There may therefore be room to put pressure on France in the trade arena. However, there is much dissatisfaction in Europe with the outcome European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen accepted. It is probably worth waiting to see how the agreement is implemented and what implications there may be for U.S.-French trade.

Yet it would be more appropriate to find an American response relevant to the foreign policy and security fields. Mr. Macron’s decision to snub his nose at the Abraham Accords by promoting the U.N. route provides grounds to, for example, curtail U.S. intelligence sharing with France.

France is not part of the “Five Eyes,” but it nonetheless depends extensively on U.S. support in the domains of counterterrorism, military reconnaissance and cybersecurity. The scope of that support could be ratcheted down without being eliminated fully. If the French leadership chooses to subvert American interests and initiatives in the Middle East, it would be reasonable for the U.S. to reduce support for France. Mr. Macron could then enjoy more “strategic autonomy” (for example, in his domestic counterterrorism operations).

Mr. Macron’s rush to a two-state solution has been widely regarded as a reward to terrorism in the wake of Oct. 7, 2023. He should therefore be prepared to deal with terrorism in France, without American hand-holding.

Alternatively, the U.S. could slow-walk military cooperation with France. This could be particularly relevant in the western Pacific, where France remains a colonial power — New Caledonia and French Polynesia, for example. It depends especially on U.S. naval cooperation for security. Invitations for French participation in joint naval drills, often with India, Australia and Japan, could be limited.

Alternatively, the dialogues between U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and French Joint Staff could be slowed down. Perhaps France should be treated as only a junior partner in the Indo-Pacific.

Such steps could and should be graduated to avoid harming U.S. interests. However, as France proves to be an unreliable partner in the Middle East, intentionally undermining President Trump’s signature effort, it would be unwise for the U.S. to rely on France in other theaters. One real victim of the Macron initiative at the U.N. has been the credibility of France as a security partner.

Correction: An earlier version of this column incorrectly included an Indian Ocean island in a list of French overseas territories in the Pacific Ocean.

• Russell A. Berman is the Walter A. Haas Professor in the Humanities at Stanford University and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution. He is also a co-chair of The Working Group on the Middle East and the Islamic World. Kiron K. Skinner is the W. Glenn Campbell Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution.