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OPINION:
The satellites go dark. That’s how it would begin.
Not with missiles, not with amphibious landings on Taiwan’s shores, but with a blackout in space. U.S. satellites, the eyes and ears of the modern battlefield, silenced or shattered. Communications scrambled. Surveillance gaps exposed. Missile warning systems blinking red or not at all.
Before the first American warship could respond, China would already be moving in.
Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth put it simply in a recent speech: “China uses its vast and sophisticated cyber capabilities to steal technology and attack critical infrastructure in your countries and in the United States as well. These actions not only compromise our countries but endanger the lives of our citizens.”
This scenario should chill every policymaker in Washington. It’s not a theory; it’s a plan, likely the plan, and we are dangerously close to being caught flat-footed.
For years, China has been preparing for a conflict in the Taiwan Strait. The country has watched, learned and zeroed in on our most critical vulnerability: our near total dependence on space to fight, see and communicate. Our constellation of military satellites enables GPS-guided weapons and coordinated operations across thousands of miles.
China has been quietly building the means to take that all away.
It has launched into orbit “satellite inspectors,” which happen to maneuver close to ours. It has also developed anti-satellite missiles and ground-based lasers. These capabilities aren’t theoretical. They’re operational.
The question is no longer whether China can blind us; it’s whether it will choose to and when.
The United States has taken steps to protect its space architecture. We have smartly begun building resilience through smaller, more distributed satellite networks in low earth orbit. But resilience alone is not a plan. It’s a stopgap. A delay tactic. It is half a strategy. What we don’t have yet is a credible ability to stop an attack in progress or recover from one quickly enough to sustain deterrence.
If we want to deter conflict and prevent a Taiwan crisis from spiraling into something far worse, we need to move urgently from a passive space posture to an active one. That means recognizing space not just as the new high ground but also as the critical first front in any major conflict.
Here’s where we need to focus:
Mobility and counterforce. We need maneuverable interceptors — think of them as the greyhounds of space — that can respond to a threat in orbit before it becomes an attack.
Layered orbits. A smart defense builds redundancy across low, medium and geosynchronous orbits to complicate enemy targeting and create operational depth.
Advanced critical upper-stage technology. This essential technology is currently underfunded, so we need to invest in high-performance upper stages capable of on-demand deployment across multiple orbital regimes. Not in days or weeks, but in hours. Without that capability, even the most resilient architecture will be unable to endure sustained attacks.
Clear doctrine. A hit on our satellites is not just a disruption. It’s an act of aggression. Deterrence works only if the rules are clear and the response is credible.
Allied action. Japan, Australia and even Taiwan rely on many of the same space-based services. We need to build shared infrastructure, coordinate surveillance and align our deterrence posture before the first shot is fired.
We are not out of time, but the clock is ticking.
Space is not a sanctuary. It is a contested domain. If we don’t defend it with the urgency and seriousness this moment demands, we may find ourselves trying to fight the next war in the dark.
We can still change the ending of this story, but only if we act now and invest with purpose.
• Tory Bruno is president and CEO of United Launch Alliance.
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