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SEOUL, South Korea — North Korean leader Kim Jong-un wants payback from Russian President Vladimir Putin for his troops’ sacrifices in the Ukraine war, which Moscow is moving belatedly to address, a leading expert said Tuesday.
Russian air interventions off the Korean Peninsula during recent South Korea-U.S. military drills and visits to Pyongyang by two Kremlin power players are likely elements of a wider exchange package for North Korea’s munitions supply and troop deployment, Doo Jin-ho told foreign reporters in Seoul.
The South Korean defense expert, who heads the global strategy division of the state-run Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, anticipates a trip by Mr. Kim to Moscow around May 9.
A formal, bilateral alliance between Moscow and Pyongyang is the most visible relationship in the CRINK, shorthand for the alignment of the authoritarian states of China, Russia, Iran and North Korea, though the degree of quadrilateral cooperation is debatable.
Pyongyang is estimated to have supplied Moscow with millions of artillery shells and tactical rockets for its war in Ukraine. Iran also has supplied weapons, notably strike drones, to Russia.
Last year, Mr. Kim and Mr. Putin signed a comprehensive strategic partnership with a mutual defense clause. Subsequently, North Korea became the only country to dispatch troops to fight in Mr. Putin’s war after Ukraine stormed into Russia’s Kursk oblast in August.
An additional dispatch of approximately 3,000 in January buttressed a dispatch of 11,000 to 13,000 elite North Korean troops in October. The North Koreans are estimated to have sustained as many as 5,000 casualties.
The two nations share a land border and are opaque states, obfuscating intelligence collection. Considerable analyses cover how and with what Moscow intends to repay Pyongyang.
Support against U.S., South Korea
On March 14, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Andrei Rudenko arrived in Pyongyang for a meeting that some analysts suspect became heated.
“I believe [Mr. Rudenko’s visit] did not have a positive atmosphere compared to past meetings,” said Mr. Doo. “I believe North Korea used the meeting to express dissatisfaction with Russia, and the Russian Embassy recommended follow-up actions.”
Moscow may have been jolted into action.
On March 15, Russian military aircraft breached South Korea’s Air Identification Zone an unprecedented eight times. The incursions compelled Seoul to scramble its warplanes.
Distinct from globally recognized sovereign airspace, an ADIZ lacks a basis in international law. However, multiple capitals have declared ADIZs as national air security perimeters.
The aerial action-reaction sequence took place during South Korea-U.S. Freedom Shield spring military drills from March 10-20.
Sergei Shoigu, secretary of the Russian State Security Council, landed in Pyongyang on March 21.
Though Western media interpreted Mr. Shoigu’s removal from his defense minister position in May 2024 as a demotion because of Russian military blunders in Ukraine, a London-based Russia expert told The Washington Times that is misreporting.
She said Mr. Shoigu has a critical role as a longtime confidant of Mr. Putin: ensuring the sustainability of Moscow’s military-industrial complex amid hostilities and sanctions.
“Shoigu was sent as special envoy right after Freedom Shield to reaffirm a commitment to North Korea in the event of a possible conflict,” Mr. Doo said. “Of course, the visit was carefully timed to avoid provoking the U.S. and to maintain South Korean relations.”
He suggested that Mr. Shoigu had three tasks in Pyongyang: to express gratitude to North Korea, reaffirm the importance of the 2024 agreement and invite Mr. Kim to Moscow.
Mr. Doo believed Mr. Kim had three grievances: delays in Russian compensation for his troop dispatch, Moscow’s passive stance on two North Korean troops captured by Ukraine, and a lack of strategic communications on Moscow’s negotiations with the Trump administration.
Two North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine have not been factored into POW exchanges, which are routinely negotiated between Kyiv and Moscow, and may defect to South Korea.
Victory Day visit?
Mr. Doo expected Mr. Kim to continue troop deployments to earn “a political stake” at the conflict’s end.
The deputy chief of the North Korean General Staff, the director of army operations and the commander of the Reconnaissance General Bureau, North Korea’s intelligence and sabotage arm, remain in Russia.
North Koreans have sustained heavy casualties. Because of language and doctrinal barriers, they cannot operate effectively with Russian armor, artillery, air power or drones. They have taken on a high-risk battlefield role as unsupported infantry shock troops.
They also have demonstrated impressive physical fitness and marksmanship while maintaining unit cohesion and determination.
“I think Kim is using troop levels as a bargaining chip,” Mr. Doo said. “I believe he is monitoring the Russian response … whether it offers meaningful compensation for his deployment and losses.”
Mr. Doo believes preliminary talks are underway before May 9.
That date, Russia’s Victory Day, marks the end of World War II in Europe and holds special significance this year: 2025 marks the 80th anniversary of the war’s end.
Even so, Mr. Doo does not anticipate Mr. Kim joining Mr. Putin on the Kremlin saluting podium, given that other national leaders, such as Chinese President Xi Jinping, are expected.
“Kim Jong-un has not attended any multilateral summits,” Mr. Doo said. “He is not well prepared.”
Though North Korean troops may goose-step with Russian troops on Red Square on May 9, he expected that Mr. Putin and Mr. Kim would cement ties and sign deals before or after Victory Day.
In addition to supplies of oil and grain — key strengths of the Russian economy and major weaknesses in North Korea — he said Moscow may upgrade North Korea’s satellite and air defense technologies.
Warplanes and surface warships are two assets Russia might donate, Mr. Doo said: Mr. Kim’s air force and navy are low-tech.
He did not expect Russia to upgrade North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction, including its nascent nuclear submarine program.
That would infuriate the U.S., a target for those classes of armaments, and could grant North Korea strategic independence, reducing Russian influence.
Regardless of what Russia offers, North Korea’s army — which before last year had not fought a major conflict since 1953 — is likely reaping the benefits of millennial combat exposure.
“On April 4, Kim gave on-site guidance to his special forces and said they have to enhance tactics and capabilities in line with evolving trends,” Mr. Doo said. “North Korean soldiers are learning the modern warfare landscape.”
• Andrew Salmon can be reached at asalmon@washingtontimes.com.
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