Trump’s ‘Golden Dome’ for a far more dangerous world? For sure

OPINION:

Here, we expand on our Feb. 2 view that “Trump’s Iron Dome strategy echoes Reagan’s SDI missile defense vision.” We applaud President Trump’s reference to it as a beautiful “Golden Dome” that can protect the entire free world from missile, hypersonic and drone attacks emanating from known and unknown missile threats worldwide.

It’s a particularly appropriate update after the 42nd anniversary of President Reagan’s March 23, 1983, speech and subsequent actions that led to his Strategic Defense Initiative.

At the height of the Cold War, SDI brought the Soviets back to the table after they walked out of all negotiations, alleging “Star Wars” was the cause. In fact, they were seeking to influence national elections in the U.S. and among most of our closest allies. After regular consultation with our allies, all these national leaders were reelected.

After SDI prompted a major interest in space, the Nuclear and Space Talks began in March 1985. We were at the Geneva negotiating table defending SDI in the Defense and Space Talks component, which provided negotiating leverage for the associated Strategic Arms Reduction Talks and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty talks.

Those negotiations led to the first-ever major reductions in nuclear weapons without any limits beyond the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty placed on SDI (renamed Ballistic Missile Defense) programs to develop missile defenses for the United States and our friends and allies. This constraint, as a matter of international law, on the development, testing and deployment of ballistic missile defense systems continued until June 2002, when President George W. Bush withdrew from its terms. Nevertheless, many among the so-called arms control elite still seek to constrain our ability to employ/deploy our most capable technologies to protect all Americans and our friends and allies by the most effective means by far: with space-based defenses.

As we defended SDI in our negotiations with the Soviet Union, we collaborated with all our allies. SDI’s global reach attracted them so much that many participated in its research and development. In many ways, this was NATO’s finest hour. Japan provided well over $1 billion to help develop and deploy its first ballistic missile defense systems.

We can still realize Reagan’s SDI vision. Exciting new technologies give life to the basic ideas and concepts to defend against all kinds of missiles, particularly from space.

As former Cold Warriors, we see the world as far more dangerous now than when the Soviet Union was at its peak threat. We have several reasons for our view, including a better ability to define the threat and construct/maintain our forces to deter it.

We did this for many years during the Cold War, echoing the wisdom of Gen. Russell Dougherty, former Strategic Air Command Commander, who said deterrence required two essential elements: capability and will. We had both, without any doubt, and assured that condition by maintaining a capability to retaliate in kind to any Soviet nuclear attack.

We maintained a survivable retaliatory capability of nuclear-armed intercontinental-range ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles and a major fleet of nuclear-armed strategic bombers, but we limited our efforts to defend against ballistic missile attacks, sometimes described as assuring our survival against an “accidental launch.” Initially, the ABM Treaty limited us to two ground-based sites and eventually morphed into today’s single site in Alaska.

This condition was shorthanded as mutually assured destruction, a less-pertinent condition today as we confront two “peer” nuclear threats, Russia and China, and lesser threatening powers with nuclear weapons, such as North Korea and possibly Iran.

The idea of mutually assured destruction never satisfied Reagan, and he called for new conditions. To quote from his speech that launched SDI:

“I am directing a comprehensive and intensive effort to define a long-term research and development program to begin to achieve our ultimate goal of eliminating the threat posed by strategic nuclear missiles. This could pave the way for arms control measures to eliminate the weapons themselves. We seek neither military superiority nor political advantage. Our only purpose, one all people share, is to search for ways to reduce the danger of nuclear war. My fellow Americans, tonight we are launching an effort which holds the promise of changing the course of human history. There will be risks, and results take time. But I believe we can do it.”

We were privileged to participate in negotiations with the Soviet Union and defend SDI against its threats. Those negotiations led to major reductions in nuclear weapons, as was Reagan’s objective.

Today, we need much more than simple deterrence. We need a ubiquitous/universal missile/hyper/drone system of defensive capabilities and technologies that depend on new and ever-evolving technologies. This includes space-based sensors and anti-missile (especially launch phase) interceptors, and eventually enhanced ground-, air- and space-based directed energy defenses.

We should invite and include our allies in this entire defense force concept. As we did during the Cold War, we should share mission responsibilities, including threat assessments and operational information, with integrated command and control. We also should include coordinated and integrated systems technology upgrades and updates and appropriate cost-sharing for the development and operational aspects of the required systems with worldwide effectiveness. In short, we can do it, and we should get busy with it.

• Henry F. Cooper was President Reagan’s ambassador and defense and space negotiator with the Soviet Union, and subsequently SDI director, and Daniel J. Gallington was Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger’s representative in those talks and served in several senior congressional and administration positions.