- The Washington Times - Monday, April 14, 2025

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China is using consulting firms, headhunters and think tanks to aggressively recruit current and former U.S. officials as spies, a federal counterspy unit says.

“Foreign intelligence entities, particularly those in China, are targeting current and former U.S. government employees for recruitment by posing as consulting firms, corporate headhunters, think tanks and other entities on social and professional networking sites,” the National Counterintelligence and Security Center stated in a one-page warning.

The FBI echoed the warning on X. “China and other foreign intelligence entities are targeting former and current U.S. government employees on social and professional networking sites,” the bureau said in a post.



The FBI is the lead federal agency in charge of domestic counterintelligence. It declared on its website that Chinese Communist Party spying is “a grave threat” and a top counterintelligence priority.

Chinese spies are using sophisticated deception ploys, including job offers and other virtual appeals, to target people with government experience who are seeking employment, the counterintelligence notice said.

The Trump administration is downsizing the U.S. government, including at national security agencies.

Since January, the administration has taken steps to close several federal agencies and has dismissed about 80 probationary CIA employees. Other officials engaged in diversity, equity and inclusion programs have also been fired.

The U.S. Agency for International Development, with about 10,000 employees worldwide, has been mostly shut down after government efficiency investigators traced some of its activities to liberal Democratic political operations.

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The case of Navy Chief Petty Officer Thomas Zhao was mentioned in the counterintelligence report as an example.

Zhao was sentenced to prison in January 2024 for providing sensitive U.S. military information to a Chinese intelligence officer in exchange for more than $14,000 in cash. Zhao was recruited through a social media chat group on stock trading.

From Zhao, China was able to obtain photos, videos and documents about U.S. military exercises and radar facilities in the Pacific. This information could be valuable for China’s military in a future conflict with the United States.

The counterintelligence notice said the online targeting could be on social media, professional networking sites or online employment forums.

Direct email messages and other messaging platforms also are used.

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“Recruiters may appear to be affiliated with a legitimate firm from a non-alerting country,” the report said.

The counterspy center reminded former U.S. officials with security clearances who had access to secrets of “their legal obligation to protect classified data even after departing [U.S. government] service.”

China used the social media site Bluesky to attempt to recruit researchers dismissed from the National Institutes of Health through offers of “career development” in Shenzhen, China.

Former FBI officials and retired U.S. military officers also are being targeted.

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Signs of intelligence targeting can include job offerings with remote work at unusually high pay scales or the use of flattery and praise to those known to have held sensitive government posts.

Chinese spy recruiters also offer pay for innocuous reports, followed by demands to produce studies using sensitive or nonpublic information.

The spy pitches may also emphasize that former officials must provide limited, one-off or exclusive reports in exchange for quick payment.

Concerns about Chinese spying and recruitment prompted the U.S. Embassy in Beijing to order all Americans in China to end personal relationships with local nationals.

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A former U.S. intelligence official said China’s communist spy recruiters use subtle and sophisticated means, such as co-opting think tanks and security assessment companies.

Many former U.S. officials, including those who held senior government positions, have gone to work for companies and organizations founded or partially owned by Chinese entities, the former official said.

The FBI, under Director Kash Patel, has focused on reforming and improving the FBI and removing politicization from criminal investigations.

Still, the new leadership team has said little about counterintelligence reform.

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Peter Strzok, a former FBI deputy counterintelligence chief, was fired in 2018 after text messages revealed he had told his mistress that the FBI would prevent Donald Trump from being elected in 2016.

Former Defense Intelligence Agency counterintelligence specialist Nicholas Eftimiades said China’s Ministry of State Security, the main spy service, has significantly altered its overseas operations in the past five years with stepped-up online recruitment, including the use of LinkedIn.

“Recruitment approaches through LinkedIn have become standard MSS operational practice,” Mr. Eftimiades said in a new book, “Chinese Espionage Operations and Tactics.”

He said the MSS conducted some 20,000 online recruitment attempts in Britain, 4,000 in France and more than 10,000 in Germany using pitches to former officials.

“Recruitment approaches are often subtle, offering paid consultancies, free business trips to China, and other monetary incentives,” he said.

“Once the target provides data, the relentless pressure comes to provide nonpublic information.”

Although many intelligence services use LinkedIn and other social media platforms, Mr. Eftimiades said MSS’s volume of targeting is unique.

The MSS targets those with active security clearances, financial problems, personal likes, political views and professional contacts within commercial, defense, scientific and intelligence sectors.

Mr. Eftimiades said the case of Chinese agent Christine Fang, also known as Fang Fang, is an example of how the MSS uses students for long-term intelligence gathering and recruitment.

Ms. Fang arrived in the United States in 2009 as a student at California State University. She “raised funds and volunteered for several area politicians, including numerous city and state-level politicians, including Eric Swalwell and Tulsi Gabbard,” he said. Both were subsequently elected to Congress, and Ms. Gabbard is now director of national intelligence.

“The FBI reported that Fang was deeply engaged in romantic relationships with at least two Southwestern mayors,” Mr. Eftimiades said. “Media interviews report that she was active in relationships with 10 or more politicians.”

China is engaged in a massive “whole-of-society” approach to espionage and is a key element in the U.S.-China trade war over American demands that Beijing halt the theft of intellectual property and trade secrets, Mr. Eftimiades said.

China’s espionage activities are changing the global balance of power, impacting the U.S. and foreign economies, and providing challenges to domestic, national security and foreign policy formulation,” he said.

• Bill Gertz can be reached at bgertz@washingtontimes.com.

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