OPINION:
The predictable Beltway reaction to President-elect Donald Trump’s recent statements regarding potential U.S. control of both Greenland and the Panama Canal ranged from outrage to horror, with a touch of sneering condescension. Instead, the appropriate reaction should be one of relief that an American president, after decades of misbegotten overseas adventures and a disturbingly broad interpretation of U.S. national interests, clearly understands America’s core interests and is prepared to act accordingly.
Mr. Trump’s comments on “purchasing” Greenland, beginning in his first term and reiterated in recent days, and supplemented with recent statements about reestablishing American “control” over the Panama Canal, have historical precedent.
President Abraham Lincoln’s secretary of state, William Seward, spoke of the strategic value of acquiring Greenland as early as the 1860s, and the U.S. even occupied the island during World War II to prevent Nazi interference. The Panama Canal and the American-controlled Canal Zone surrounding it were acquired through U.S. leadership in the early 1900s, and the blood, sweat and tears of Americans resulted in one of the most impressive engineering feats of the 20th century. The strategic value of Greenland and the canal was considered axiomatic for much of American history.
More broadly, Mr. Trump’s focus on strategic choke points such as Greenland and the Panama Canal demonstrates a reversion to traditional conceptions of core U.S. interests that the Founding Fathers would have instantly understood. John Quincy Adams, who as secretary of state in 1823 helped codify the Monroe Doctrine rejecting European interference in the Western Hemisphere, tenaciously argued throughout his long career for an American foreign policy rooted in the defense of the U.S. homeland and key geographies, such as Latin America, that could be used to pose threats to the United States.
The “neoconservatives” of Adams’ day sought to enmesh the U.S. in Greece’s War of Independence based on shared liberal values. Greece was the early 19th century’s version of Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan. Adams and others rejected such arguments favoring a narrow interpretation of American interests and potential threats.
A generally prudent foreign policy served the United States well into the second half of the 20th century, when American primacy in the aftermath of World War II, especially victory in the Cold War, emboldened Washington to dramatically expand any historic definition of U.S. interests. The results have been nothing short of catastrophic, producing forever wars in the Middle East and South Asia; enormous human and financial costs; and a window of distraction that was filled by China.
As he enters office for a second term, Mr. Trump has a unique opportunity to refocus Americans on core interests and rewrite the Washington narrative on foreign policy for another generation. He is prioritizing the Western Hemisphere, as shown by his focus on illegal immigration across the southern border; his appointment of two Latin America experts, Marco Rubio and Christopher Landau, as secretary and deputy secretary of state, respectively; his early nomination of a slew of key Latin American ambassadorships; and his designation of Mauricio Claver-Carone as special envoy for Latin America. He can quickly build upon these important signals with concrete action to refocus the U.S. on our core security interests.
First, Mr. Trump should issue an updated version of the Monroe Doctrine (call it the “Trump Doctrine”) that reinforces the original intent of the 1823 proclamation for the reality of great power competition, with Russia and China now regularly intruding near Alaska’s territorial waters and aggressively fomenting malign activity across the Western Hemisphere. The Trump Doctrine would include all U.S. territories and possessions under the original Monroe Doctrine; add Greenland to the doctrine, making clear that (other than Denmark, from which Greenlanders have sought eventual independence) no power will be permitted to gain a foothold in a strategically vital location astride the approaches to the continental U.S.; and assert that no outside power will be permitted to undertake military or economic actions in the hemisphere contrary to U.S. core security interests.
Second, Mr. Trump should quickly offer Greenland a compact of free association, assuming its eventual independence from Denmark. The U.S. would assume responsibility for Greenland’s defense needs and could base U.S. forces on the island while denying access to predatory powers such as China or Russia. Greenland would retain its sovereignty while the United States protects its national security interests and ensures global access to the island’s mineral wealth.
Third, Mr. Trump should quickly enter into negotiations with Panama for the return of the canal. The Torrijos-Carter Treaties that transferred the canal to Panama in the 1970s may have been a disaster, but they are a fact. Because of President Jimmy Carter’s failings (and those of too many Republican senators at the time), the United States will likely need to pay a considerable sum for the canal. Yet given Mr. Trump’s negotiating skills, this can likely be offset by trade preferences for the Panamanians, revenue-sharing agreements for canal fees and the considerable strategic and economic advantage of ensuring the canal is in American hands again.
Taken quickly, these three actions would not simply strengthen American economic and national security. They would fundamentally realign U.S. foreign policy to focus on the principal threats to U.S. security from this hemisphere rather than the tangential quagmires of recent decades. By acting decisively, Mr. Trump can gain extraordinary strategic advantage, cement his legacy as a transformational president and reassert his America First foreign policy.
• Alexander B. Gray served as deputy assistant to the president and chief of staff of the White House National Security Council from 2019 to 2021.
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