OPINION:
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine 10 months ago has given world leaders, diplomats and military strategists much to consider. Western leaders and their advisers need to think — now — about how the war in Ukraine might end.
In recent weeks, Russia has signaled a willingness to engage in peace talks. This is untrustworthy blather. The Russian attitude concerning negotiations is “what is ours is ours and what is yours is negotiable.” Such is the stance in Ukraine, where Moscow seeks to end the war while maintaining control of not only Crimea (unjustly seized from Ukraine in 2014) but also areas of eastern Ukraine now claimed by Russia and administered by its commissar satraps.
Meanwhile, Ukraine has articulated a negotiation framework that is enumerated. In October, President Volodymyr Zelenskyy shared his 10-point plan. The major points call for the release of all prisoners of war and deportees, restoration of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, a withdrawal of all Russian troops from Ukraine (including Crimea), punishment for war crimes, security guarantees for Ukraine, and a peace treaty. Mr. Zelenskyy’s list is principled, specific, long, and overly ambitious. The negotiation gap is large. This is why Western nations need to think about what is achievable between the combatants.
Thankfully, Ukraine appears to have the military advantage bolstered by U.S. and NATO aid and weapons systems that have laid waste to Russia’s vaunted military. Indeed, Russia is on its heels politically, diplomatically, militarily and economically. Moreover, President Vladimir Putin is not well, reportedly being kept alive by his oncologists. His prognosis is poor. Time is not on his side. As such, the U.S. and NATO must be prepared for Mr. Putin’s potential departure from the scene, either in a hearse or by exile. What happens then? There are several possibilities.
A Putin successor could elect to continue the war. But absent significant escalation to reverse Russia’s battlefield fortunes, that strategy could be costly, especially if U.S. and NATO resolve and assistance continue. It is possible — but unlikely — that a successor government could simply deescalate and withdraw troops to prewar lines while blaming the preceding administration for “mistakes.” Securing an offramp to attain “peace with honor,” however, would be more pragmatic for a successor government. Yet that approach might also be elongated and accompanied by efforts to “dig in” and retain territory Russia currently holds as a bargaining chip.
Nonetheless, battlefield reality will play a decisive role in setting the conditions for peace negotiations. Continued Ukrainian counteroffensive victories — something we should encourage — could create a fait accompli for a Russian successor. But continued Ukrainian battlefield successes do pose a dilemma for the U.S. and NATO in shaping a peace process.
Specifically, how can a new Russian leader be persuaded to gracefully accept Ukrainian victory and Mr. Zelenskyy’s insistence on a reckoning for the damage Russia has done to his country? Put another way, how do we embrace Ukrainian demands for justice and territorial control in a manner that encourages a Russian successor regime to engage in a peace process?
It’s a problem, but a good one to have. Why? Because in a postwar environment, the U.S. and NATO have an opportunity to reset the security table in Europe while making clear to Russia that we have no desire to see it further degrade into a pariah state. Given the negotiation gap between the combatants, however, there must be much diplomacy ahead, and a rational peace framework needs to be shaped now. In that regard, the U.S. and NATO should be prepared to offer specifics.
First, establish a cease-fire agreement along an armistice demarcation line (ADL) that fixes the limits of advance by both forces. Second, delineate a demilitarized zone (DMZ) on both sides of the ADL sufficiently large to deter a rapid return to armed conflict by either side. Third, deploy a competent international military enforcement and observer force with a realistic and attainable mandate to validate that armed forces have evacuated the DMZ. Fourth, exchange all POWs and soldiers killed in action and repatriate captured civilians, including children. Fifth, deploy an international de-mining task force to deactivate unexploded ordnance so civilians can live and work in safety. Sixth, implement an internationally supervised indigenous gendarmerie in the DMZ to restore order accompanied by a justice system to adjudicate those accused of crimes.
Finally, form a standing international peace commission to draft a peace treaty, establish security parameters, and address reparations and war crimes. But Russia — which started this war — must fully comply with all peace conditions before economic sanctions are lifted. That’s non-negotiable.
Now is the time to consider these ideas, even though more combat is ahead. When the opportunity for peace is ripe — and that may occur suddenly following successful Ukrainian counteroffensives or Mr. Putin’s demise — the pickers had better be in place with a plan that can be implemented.
• L. Scott Lingamfelter is a retired Army colonel and author of “Desert Redleg: Artillery Warfare in the First Gulf War” (University Press of Kentucky). His new book, “Yanks in Blue Berets: American UN Peacekeepers in the Middle East,” will be released by UPK on July 4.
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