No, Ukraine won’t deploy a dirty bomb

OPINION:

Russia consistently dreams up one excuse after another to justify additional devastation of Ukraine. Nearly all of their claims have been equally ridiculous, starting with the pretext for the invasion itself, which was to “de-Nazify” Ukraine (led by its Jewish president). Let’s look at their most recent claim: that Ukraine is about to deploy a “dirty bomb,” presumably against Russia.

What is a dirty bomb? It is not a nuclear weapon and as such does not contain any of the fissile material (highly enriched uranium or plutonium) normally found in nuclear weapons. Rather, it is merely a conventional explosive such as dynamite or military C-4 wrapped around a sealed radiation source such as radium, cobalt or iridium such as might be found in any major metropolitan hospital’s nuclear medicine section. When a dirty bomb detonates, it is the conventional explosive — and not the radioactivity — that causes the immediate death and destruction.

Dirty bombs are weapons of mass disruption and not weapons of mass destruction since they are truly a point/limited area weapon and cannot have a greater effect than any other conventional weapon of similar size.

Of course, it is a matter of concern that there is some radioactive material scattered about at the blast site, but in an area where a war is being fought, it is hard to quantify that danger as more significant than any of the other dangers that soldiers must confront. Assuming that soldiers do not camp or rest at the blast site for any length of time, the added danger to them would be minimal.

Any significant blast in a U.S. city during peacetime would be tested for radiation because such a blast would be an anomaly. On the battlefields of Ukraine, however, hundreds if not thousands of blasts and explosions from artillery, rockets, tanks, hand grenades and land mines are routine. No one would even think of testing any of the thousands of explosions for radiation.

Indeed, to claim to have found evidence of a dirty bomb would be nearly prima facie evidence that the discoverer was also the one who built and detonated it. While a dirty bomb would scatter radioactive material and, if discovered, would surely create additional panic, although only those in close proximity to the blast would need to be concerned about radiation exposure. It is likely that they would have far more immediate concerns from the explosion itself. Some radiation and radioactive dust would spread and slowly sicken others exposed to it. In short, in Ukraine, a dirty bomb would have virtually no military utility and such use would be pointless.

The real purpose of a dirty bomb would be to provide pretext for Russia to further escalate, including and up to the use of a tactical nuclear weapon, which Russian President Vladimir Putin has been threatening for months.

It is important to remain aware that a dirty bomb and a tactical nuclear weapon are remotely in the same category. A dirty bomb would likely have no more explosive capability than several hand grenades or an artillery shell. A tactical nuclear weapon, even at 10 kilotons, would provide the equivalent blast of 20 million pounds of conventional explosive. In other words, there is no comparison, and to therefore use a dirty bomb as a justification for use of a tactical nuclear weapon is to compare being hit with a feather to being hit by Mike Tyson a thousand times.

Given that a nuclear weapon has not been used in war since 1945, a taboo has existed regarding the use of such weapons. Should that taboo be broken by one of the five recognized nuclear weapons states under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty — especially with such a weak pretext — it would have an immediate and dramatic adverse effect on the sturdiness of the treaty itself and on the worldwide nuclear nonproliferation regime. Some states would no doubt decide that they now need nuclear weapons; other states would perceive a lower threshold for their use.

Nothing good — for Russia or anyone else — could come from any Russian use of nuclear weapons. Mr. Putin would be well advised to stop threatening their use.

David S. Jonas is a partner at the FH+H Law Firm in Tysons, Virginia. He teaches nuclear nonproliferation law & policy at Georgetown and George Washington University law schools and he served as the nuclear nonproliferation planner for the Joint Chiefs of Staff.