Proactive nuclear disarmament talks must begin now before its too late

OPINION:

Less than 20 years after World War II ended, the United States and Soviet Union approached the brink of nuclear annihilation in the Cuban Missile Crisis. But the near-apocalyptic event of 1962 came with a silver lining: It paved the way for two decades of arms control and de-escalation (detente). The crisis begot a number of landmark international security treaties including the “Helsinki Final Act” of 1975 viewed as a watershed in Cold War diplomacy.

Forty-five years later, the idea of reaching a similar level of cooperation on the nuclear disarmament or European security seems outlandish. Russians recently rammed American soldiers in Syria, while Russian fighters threatened a B-52 in international airspace.   

Chaos in Belarus followed a rigged election. The poisoning of Kremlin critic Alexei Navalny, and Russia’s pressure on Ukraine are testaments to the rapid deterioration of the continent’s security. Furthermore, the United States and Russia are presently backsliding on a number of arms control agreements from “Open Skies” to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF).

We are, however, approaching the 10-year anniversary of another significant non-proliferation achievement: U.N. resolution 64/35 or the “International Day against Nuclear Tests” on August 29. The world needs new treaty architecture for de-escalation to take place, but it cannot happen without goodwill and open diplomacy.

In the wake of the Cuban Missile Crisis, both the United States and Soviet Union shared a mutual incentive to reduce the risk of nuclear war and to rein in the exorbitant costs of the arms race. In 1963, the two sides signed the Limited Test Ban Treaty, which was the first nuclear arms control agreement of the Cold War. The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968 and the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks/Treaty (SALT) of 1972 followed thereafter. These agreements formed the bedrock of today’s global nuclear security architecture.

Next, in 1975 world leaders came together in Helsinki, Finland, to codify the post-World War II status quo. Thirty-five signatory nations committed to fundamental principles guiding their relations. The last major arms control agreement of the Cold War — the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) — was signed just months before the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

By 2001, Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine relinquished their stockpiles, thereby eliminating 80% of global nuclear material. New START, signed by President Barack Obama and Russian President Dmitry Medvedev in 2010, is set to expire in February of 2021 as the White House and Kremlin seem unlikely to compromise.

China’s adamant refusal to take part in the New Start talks is the primary obstacle to U.S. and Russian efforts to extend New START through to 2026. Despite Russian overtures to renew the agreements bilaterally, President Donald Trump has thus far insisted on a trilateral deal that includes China. To bring Beijing to the negotiating table, Mr. Trump floated the idea of re-commencing U.S. nuclear weapons tests for the first time since 1992.

This assertive tactic — on top of U.S. withdrawal from the 2015 Iran deal and 1987 INF treaty — marks the latest erosion of the arms control framework built throughout the Cold War. Renewing nuclear tests would be destabilizing. The White House should accept the Kremlin’s offer to move ahead with the 5-year extension of New Start, while seeking a multilateral nuclear agreement with Beijing.

Central Asia, landlocked between Russia and China, knows first-hand the devastating effects of nuclear proliferation. Kazakhstan’s Semipalatinsk site was a principal testing grounds for the USSR. It saw staggering 456 nuclear tests between 1949 and 1989 and the effects of radiation contamination are still lingering. Subsequently, when it closed the testing grounds in 1991, Kazakhstan proposed to create the International Day Against Nuclear Tests, observed for its 10th year this past Aug. 29.

The region has also come together to negotiate The Central Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty (CANWFZ), which prevents Central Asian nations from conducting research on, developing, stockpiling or testing nuclear weapons.

On the 10th anniversary of the International Day Against Nuclear Tests, it would behoove the world’s nuclear states to explore the possibilities of opening new channels, including through neutral countries like Finland and Kazakhstan. Rather than trashing the hard-fought non-proliferation treaties such as New Start, the INF, and CTBT, leaders should take a page from the past to find common ground for contemporary arms control regimes.

With unprecedented U.S.-China and U.S.-Russia tensions escalating, we find ourselves in perhaps the most hazardous stage of nuclear weapons proliferation since the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Proactive multilateral disarmament diplomacy is the order of the day — before it is too late.

• Joseph Adam Ereli was the U.S. State Department spokesman, U.S., the U.S. ambassador to the Kingdom of Bahrain and the principal deputy assistant secretary of State. James Grant is a research fellow with the International Tax and Investment Center in Washington, D.C.